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Cert to CA 9 (Tang, Chambers 
Boochever) 
Federal/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr argues that (1) interstate transportation 
of stolen copyrighted material is not transportation of "goods, 
wares or merchandise" under the National Stolen Property Act; and 
(2) use of the mails to promote the sale of copyright-infringing 
materials cannot canstitute mail fraud. 
i 
• 
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2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Petr operated a massive 
mail order business in "bootleg" Elvis Presley phonograph 
records. He marketed seven phonograph albums that petr himself 
created, using copyrighted Elvis Presley recordings without con-
sent from the copyright holders. The recordings were made from 
TV shows, movies, and studio "out-takes" -- recorded material 
never used on RCA's final albums. Petr obtained the out-takes by 
bribing NBC-TV officials or by other fraudulent means. 
Petr, who 1 i ved in Maryland, mailed 50,000 catalogues in 
1979 via California mailing service, which in turn mailed petr 
any orders received. Petr would then mail out bootleg albums to 
states across the nation. Petr's postal bills were over 
$1,000/week. 
Petr was convicted in a stipulated bench trial for inter-
state transportation of stolen property (18 u.s.c. §2314), con-
spiracy to do same, copyright infringement (17 U.S.C. 506(a), and 
mail fraud (18 u.s.c. §1341). He does not challenge his copy-
right infringement convictions (which, at the time, were misde-
meanors). 
CA 9 affirmed on all counts. First, it ruled that prosecu-
tion under the Copyright was not exclusive, and the additional 
mail fraud charges were proper. Nothing in the legislative his-
tory of 17 U.S.C. §506(a) indicates Congressional intent to make 
the criminal copyright law exclusive, and the 1982 Piracy and 
Counterfeiting Amendments (not applicable to petr's offenses be-
cause committed prior to 1982) indicated clear Congressional in-
tent to make the penalties of §506(a) apply "in addition to any 
_( 
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other provisions of Title 17 or any other law." The Court relied 
on its prior decision to the same effect, United States v. Bel-
mont, 715 F.2d 459 (CA 9 1983), cert. denied, 104 s.ct. 1275 
(1984). 
Second, the court ruled that petr' s actions constituted a 
"scheme to defraud" within the meaning of the mail fraud statute, 
18 u.s.c. §1341. Petr had a statutory duty to notify copyright 
holders of his intention to market their copyrighted materials, 
under 17 u.s.c. § 115. By failing to act consistently with the 
statute, petr was defrauding the copyright holders. Violation of 
this statutory duty was sufficient to constitute a basis for a 
"scheme to defraud," even though CA 9 had suggested in other 
cases that only violation of a fiduciary duty would suffice. 
Third, CA 9 held that although petr's mailings were not di-
rected to the copyright holders, they certainly were "in further-
ance of" the scheme by which those holders were defrauded of 
their right to claim royalties. 
Fourth, the court held that interstate transportation of 
bootleg recordings constituted transportation of a "good, ware, 
or merchandise" under the National Stolen Property Act, 18 u.s.c. 
§2314, again relying on its prior Belmont decision. There CA 9 
had held to the same effect, stating (715 F.2d, at 461-62) that 
"The rights of copyright owners in their protected 
property are just as deserving of protection from in-
terstate transportation as are the ownership interests 
of those who own other types of property. When society 
creates new kinds of property and thieves devise new 
ways of appropriating that property •.• the law against 
transporting property expands with the growth of vari-
eties of property." 
- - 4 - -
The court also rejected petr's argument that Sony Corp. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, 104 s.ct. 774 (1984) somehow overruled this 
reasoning in Belmont. 
Finally, the court rejected an argument that admission of a 
statement made by a third party was error because it was hearsay. 
Petr does not challenge this ruling in his cert petition. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
Petr: First, Congress did not intend for laws other than 
the copyright laws to protect against defrauding copyright hold-
ers. That's why there is a criminal portion of the Copyright 
Act, conviction under which petr does not protest. By referring 
to "the judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded 
by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance" in Sony, 
78 L.Ed 2d, at 585, this Court has in effect overruled CA 9's 
Belmont decision. "The remedies for infringement 'are only those 
prescribed by Congress.'" Ibid. Here the copyright infringement 
statute under which petr was convicted explicitly reaches the 
conduct at issue, whereas mail fruad and transportation of stolen 
property do not. In the face of such ambiguous general statutes, 
the rule of lenity, inter alia, requires that the more specific 
statute be applied to the exclusion of the others. 
Second, CA 5 in United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234 (CA 5 
1982) held that recording and distributing copyrighted television 
programs could not sustain a conviction for interstate transpor-
tation of stolen goods under§ 2314, and that copyright infringe-
ment does not constitute "taking by fraud." Id., at 239. In the 
face of this argument, CA 9 explicitly stated that "if, indeed, 
• 
- - 5 - -
the Fifth Circuit takes a different view of the matter, we are 
not bound to follow it. Thus there is a direct conflict between 
this case and CA 5. 
Third, misappropriating someone's copyright rights is not at 
all the equivalent to stealing their property. This Court re-
jected such simple-minded analogies in Sony. See 78 L. Ed. 2d at 
586 & n .13 (copyright holders never have absolute control of 
their material, e.g., it is subject to "fair use" exception); id. 
at 597 n.33 (private copying of copyrighted video material for 
"timeshifting" purposes not at all like stealing jewelry for pri-
vate use). No evidence indicates that any of the material used 
by petr to produce his records was itself stolen. It streches 
the National Stolen Property Act beyond all fairness and common 
sense to apply it here. 
Fourth, this decision conflicts with applications of the 
mail fraud law in United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492 (CA 4 
1975) and United States v. Gallant, 570 F.Supp. 303 (SONY 1983). 
Brewer held that someone who used the mails to sell cigarettes so 
that customers could avoid paying sales tax could be convicted of 
mail fraud. But here petr did not allow customers to avoid pay-
ing taxes, or even royalties, since none were due from t~e cus-
tomers. And Gallant held that an interstate distributer of boot-
leg records could not be convicted of mail fruad. CA 9's attempt 
to distinguish petr's case because he was a manufacturer is spe-
cious, because under the Copyright Act both manufacturers and 
distributors of copyrighted mnaterials have the identical duty to 
( 
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give notice of their intent to the copyright holders. 17 u.s.c. 
§115. 
Resp: Smith was wrongly decided, and is an anomoly among 
many other decisions that are consistent with this one. More-
over, Smith is distinguishible, because there the defendant had 
taped copyrighted materials "off the air," whereas here the copy-
righted materials themselves were fraudulently obtained by petr. 
This Court has denied cert in many other cases raising the same 
conflict petr points to. 
Nothing in the legislative history of §506 indicates that 
Congress did not intend more traditional, general, criminal stat-
utes to apply if their elements could be proven, and the 1982 
legislative history confirms that this is Congress's view. Also, 
since Congress made offenses like these felonies in the 1982 
amendments to the Copyright Act, this case presents no important 
question for review. 
As for mail fraud, this Court has ruled that that crime 
merely requires proof of " ( 1) a scheme to defraud, and ( 2) the 
mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the 
scheme." Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1,8 (1954). Thus CA 
9' s suggestion that violation of ~ type of specific duty is 
required goes farther than the law actually requires. Under 
Pereira's reasoning, Brewer and this case are entirely consist-
ent. As for Gallant, the government there made the mistake of 
conceding that a distributor owed no statutory duty to copyright 
holders. In any case, CA 2 has adopted the Brewer reasoning, 
·' 
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specifically avoided by SONY in Gallant, since Gallant was decid-
ed. United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d at 761. 
4. DISCUSSION: There is a direct conflict between this 
case and Smith, and the distinction that the SG proposes is illu-
sory. But the Court has consistently denied cert in other cases 
raising that conflict, apparently on the premise that Smith was 
wrong and that CA 5 will reconsider Smith if given the chance. 
See, e.g., Nos. 84-328, 5163, 5219, 5319 (all cert. denied Nov. 
26, 1984, White, J., dissenting). 
The 1982 legislative history is irrelevant here, I think. 
But the normal rule is that criminal statutes will apply to con-
duct which fits the illegal elements, unless there exists legis-
lative intent to the contrary. Moreover, the SG is right that in 
light of the 1982 Piracy amendments, which makes pirating of 
copyrighted material a felony, the government is unlikely to feel 
the need to prosecute for mail fraud or interstate transportation 
in cases like these in the future. 
I also think it clear that Sony has nothing to do with this 
case; the question there was whether video recording for one-
time, personal use constituted copyright infringement. The ma-
jority held that it was not infringement but "fair use," and did 
not address broader issues not presented on the record before it. 
Sony did not even touch upon possible criminal prosecutions, and 
it seems clear that by no stretch of the imagination can petr's 
scheme be termed "fair use." 
The SG is entirely right that application of the mail fraud 
statute is proper in a case like this, and no cases actually con-
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flict (although Gallant comes close). At mostj this issue should 
perk awhile in the CAs. 
The concept that copies of copyrighted audio or video re-
cordings represent "stolen goods" is not an intuitively obvious 
one. The Smith conflict is clear, and the Smith position is not 
an unreasonable one by any means. But this Court's prior refus-
als to review the conflict, and the fact that this case came out 
the "right" way, suggest that cert should be denied. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: Unless the Conference wants to take up 
the Smith conflict, I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
December 19, 1984 Little Opn in petn 




April 1, 1985 
DOWLING GINA-POW 
84-589 Dowling v. United States(CA9) 
(April 17 Argument) 
MEMO TO FILE 
This case was granted to resolve a conflict. The 
case involves the unauthorized production and distribution 
in interstate commerce of record albums containing 
copyrighted compositions peformed by Elvis Presley. The 
facts are stipulated. Dowling, with others, was operating 
a major business of producing an selling albums in 
violation of the copyright laws. Petitioner was indicted 
and convicted, however, of violating the National Stolen 
Property Act, 18 u.s.c. § 2314. He also was convicted of 
mail fraud and of conspiracy to transport stolen property 
in interstate commerce in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 371. 
We limited the grant of ce r t to whether the courts 
below erred in holding that petitioner had violated the 
National Stolen Property Act. That act, in simple terms, 
provides as follows: 
"Whoever transports 
foreign commerce any goods, 
securities or money, of the 
more, knowing the same to 
converted or taken by fraud" 
in interstate or 
wares, merchandise, 
value of $5,000 or 
have been stolen, 
shall be fined not 
" 
.,. - -
more than $10,000 nor imprisoned for more than 
10 years, or both. 
2. 
Petitioner's brief makes rather a persuasive case for 
the view that the National Stolen Property Act does not 
apply to copyright. He contends that the usual and common 
sense meaning of the terms "goods, wares and merchandise" 
simply does not include copyright. A copyright is an 
intangible right or privilege that is distinct from the 
physical or tangible object in which it is embodied. 
Goods, wares and merchandise, on the other hand, conote a 
tangible object. Peti ti ti oner relies on the legislative 
history as well as the plain language of the act. 
Petitioner also heavily relies on this Court's recent 
decision in Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios (by 
JPS). In that case, the Court said: 
"The protection given to a copyright is 
wholly statutory" and "the remedies for 
infringement are only those prescribed by 
Congress". As copyright law is purely 
statutory, the plausible argument is made that 
the Judiciary - in the absence of clear 
legislative intention - cannot expand remedies 
for copyright infringements beyond those 
specifically adopted by Congress. 
~ .. - - 3. 
The SG's brief has not been filed (at least has not 
been brought to my attention). His brief in opposition to 
the granting of cert lists a number of cases in which this 
Court previously has denied cert on claims similar to 
those made by petitioner. Seep. 5 of the SG's brief in 
opposition, where he cites - among other cases - four 
cases in which Justice White dissented from denial of 
cert. 
The SG did not address Sony, or do more than mention 
that the case is now of 1 imi ted importance anyway since 
the adoption in 1982 of the Piracy and Counterfeiting Act. 
In general, the SG's brief in opposition is not 
particularly helpful. 
Until the SG's principal brief is filed, I will 
withhold even a tentative judgment beyond saying that - at 
leat on the face of it - petitioner makes a rather 
persausive argument. I will only want a very brief 
memorandum from my clerk, as the case is not of vast 
importance. 
LFP, JR. 
- - Jaunary 11, 1985 
Court ........ . .......... . "Voted on .... . ... . ......... , 19 . . . 
Argued . . .. . .. . ....... . . . . , 19 .. . Assigned ........ . ...... .. . , 19 ... 
No. 84-589 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Justice Powell April 6, 1985 
From: Annmarie 
Re: No. 84-589, Dowling v. United States•(Cfiq} 
~ 111 '/ 
Question Presented 
Does the interstate 
I I -"\\.. 
shipment of bootleg record albums - - ___. 
constitute the interstate transportation of stolen property -within the meaning of 18 u.s.c. §2314? ---
Background 
Petr and his codefendants were involved in a large-scale 
operation to manufacture, transport, and sell bootleg copies of 
Elvis Presley recordings. They made their records from tapes of 
unreleased performances and illegal recordings of Presley's 
concerts. They acquired recordings by Presley in a variety of 
lo 
- - 2. 
illegal ways, e. g., petr paid an employee of a legitimate 
recording studio to steal copies of Presley tapes and paid bribes 
to another for access to NBC tapes of a Presley television 
program. Petr and his codefendants mailed over 50,000 catalogs 
advertising their bootleg products and sold thousands of records. . (LJ 
Petr was convicted of one count of conspiracy to transport 
'"' /Lstolen property in interstate commerce to distribute records 
~ 
without the consent of the copyright owners, in violation of 18 
u.s.c. §371; eight counts of interstate transportation of stolen ..., ~~----'--1--------
pr ope r ty, in violation of 18 u.s.c. §2314; nine counts of ___, 
copyright infringement, in violation of 17 u.s.c. §506(a); and 
three counts of mail fraud. On appeal, petr argues, inter alia, 
that the NSPA did not cover his activities, because copyright 
infringement did not constitute "goods, wares, or merchandise" 
- "'----'-"' 
within the meaning of the Act. CA9 affirmed his conviction. The 
---------------
Court granted cert to review the question whether his activities 
constitute an offense under the National Stolen Property Act 
(NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §2314. 
Statutes at Issue 
Section 2314 of the NSPA provides: 
Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce 
any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of 
the va ue o , or more, knowing the same to have 
been stolen, converted or taken by fraud; 
* * * 
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not 
more than ten years, or both. 




Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for 
purposes of commercial advantage or private gain shall 
be punished as provided in section 2319 of Title 18. 
3. 
Section 2319 of Title 18, The Piracy and Counterfeiting 
Amendment Act of 1982, provides fines and prison terms for 
violations of §506(a). The penalties vary according to the 
number of articles the copyright infringer used and whether the 
defendant had been convicted previsouly of copyright offenses. 
Discussion 
At first glance, petr makes a strong case. He contends 
that CA9 in effect has legislated a new category of copyright 
offenses, in violation of Art. 1, §8 of the Constitution, which 
gives Congress exclusive authority over copyrights. In the 
context of a criminal statute, the court's expansive reading of 
the NSPA is especially inappropriate. Petr maintains that the 
plain meaning of §2314 does not encompass copyright infringement, 
for a copyright is not a "good, ware, or merchandise" in the 
ordinary use of those terms. Moreover, according to petr, the 
legislative history does not provide any clear indication that 
Congress intended intangible property to be covered by §2314. He 








demonstrating that Congress did not think the NSPA was otherwise 
applicable to the offense of copyright infringement. 
I am persuaded by the SG' s response. The "goods" that -----------~ - --petr was convicted of transporting across state lines were not 
copyrights, but record albums. Although the albums themselves --
were not stolen, converted, or taken by fraud, the Elvis Presley 
- - 4. 
performances copied thereon clearly were. The recordings of the 
various copyrighted works were illicitly obtained at petr's 
instigation by bribes, theft, and petr's misrepresenting his 
purpose. There was evidence that petr was well aware that the 
recordings from which he made his bootleg albums were stolen and 
that the unauthorized use of copyrighted material was illegal. 
The question would be closer if petr's original 
acquisition of the Presley recordings had not been unlawful. The 
SG contends that even in this case, §2314 should be applicable, 
and I am inclined to agree. The SG argues that wrongful 
duplication of musical sounds or images would be grounds for 
characterizing the copies as "stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud," because these statutory terms cover a broad range of 
wrongful takings. For example, the SG notes that the courts have 
interpreted "stolen" for purposes of the National Motor Vehicle 
Theft Act as any felonious taking with intent to deprive the 
owner of the rights and benefits of ownership. The lower courts 
likewise have interpreted §2314 broadly. 
In sum, I think petr has misconstrued the case against him - - - ----- ---- -, 
by focusing on 
~( ,, 
the copyrights rather than the bootleg albums as --the stolen property transported across state lines. Thus, I 
don't think this is a case like Sony where the court of appeals 
in effect legislated a new copyright offense, but rather engaged 
in the routine interpretation of a criminal statute involving 
stolen property. The original acquisition of the recordings 
rather easily brings petr's bootleg records within §2314, I 
------,.._/' 
think, because the performances themselves were "stolen, ----~ -------
- - s. 
converted or taken by fraud." I think the SG may be right that 
even apart from the original shenanigans, the wrongful 
duplication itself may make the bootleg records "stolen" 
property, for the duplication was clearly intended to deprive the 
copyright owners of the benefit of their property. 
Recommendation 
I recommend affirming. 
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JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
- -~mtt Qfamt of flrt ~b .itatts 
'1ulfinghtn. J. ~ 20~'1~ 
June 4, 1985 
No. 84-589 
Dowling v. United States 
Dear Harry, 
/ 
If four others join you to reverse, 
as I do, and it falls to me to assign 
the opinion for the Court, I assign the 








~tutt <!}curl of Ur~ Jlnitt~ ~tau• 
Jl'a.lpngfon~ ~. (!}. 2.llffe'l, 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN June 4, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 84-589, Dowling v. United States 
This is the Elvis Presley records case. At conference, the 
vote was 5 to 4 to affirm, but several of the votes, mine includ-
ed, indicated that they were distinctly tentative. I suppose the 
case was assigned to me on the "least persuaded" theory. 
In any event, I am now inclined to reverse. I am not satis-
fied that the narrow interpretation we typically give federal 
criminal statutes permits S2314 to reach petitioner's conduct. I 
am particularly influenced by Congress' authority to regulate 
copyright infringement directly; this makes me reluctant to con-
clude, absent firm indications in the text or the legislative 
history, that it intended commerce power legislation to do so 
indirectly. 
I shall be glad to write up the case on a reversal basis, 
but, of course, Bill Brennan may prefer to assign it elsewhere. 
The others who voted to affirm were the Chief, Byron, Lewis, 







To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
Re: No. 84-589, Dowling v. United States 
-
As you know, Justice Blackmun switched his vote in this 
case and now will be writing for the Court coming out the other 
way. The opinion will reverse CA9 and hold that the 
transportation of records containing performances that violate 
the copyright laws does not constitute transportation of stolen 
goods within the meaning of the National Stolen Goods Property 
Act, 18 u.s.c. §2314. Although I initially recommended that you 
vote to affirm CA9, from talking with a number of other clerks, I 
think I may have been wrong. The biggest problem with CA9's view 
is that there is no way to limit its application. Every 
violation of the copyright or patent laws that involved a product 
involved in interstate commerce would be covered by the National 
Stolen Goods Property Act. As a result, the normal enforcement 
scheme for "intellectual property" violations would be displaced 
by prosecutors seeking stiffer penalties under the NSGA. There 
is virtually no indication that Congress intended this to happen. 
Thus, at this point, I would recommend waiting to see what 
Justice Blackmun's opinion says before deciding whether you want 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
- -
,jnprnnt Clfonri of tqt~b .ibttts 
Jluqinghtn, ~. Of. 20.;i'l-~ 
June 6, 1985 
Re: No. 84-589 - Dowling v. United States 
Dear Harry: 
Bill has reassigned this case to you for a reversal. 
✓ 
You are quite right that there were some "tentative" votes: 
Rehnquist tentative to reverse; W'"lite tentative to affirm. It 
may be that, given a close case, others may shift votes, but that 
cannot be determined until your opinion is circulated. 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
C HAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
j,u.p:rttttt (!tllltrl llf tqt ~h j,tatts: 
~~ullpnghtn. J. <q. 2lTffe'1~ 
June 6, 1985 
Re: No. 84-589 - Dowling v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
My notes on your views in this case were that you thought an 
"easy affirm." 






June 7, 1985 
84 - 589 Dowling v. United States 
Dear Chief : 
T'liis refers to your two letter~ of Jun~ J.6 about 
the above case, on~ to H~rr.y and one tn me-. 
In the latter to Harry , you note that there were 
some "'tentativen v.otes, ar,d that "t:>thers rna•J' sh:ift ,,ot'!s 11 
that c,J.n be determin~a 0111., when TJarry':::; •:minion i.s circu-
l?ted. 
Your 11c,te to me inquirA.s wheth'?r r would w-riti.i the 
dissent. I will, of course, do so unless someone else is 
more interested and certain of his or:- her. position. At Con-
ference I die think thq case was a, "~aey affirm", but on 
further considerntion "'. can S""'° a good ~c:;tl of m~r it to Ha:r-
ry ' s current views . 
Hevert!1eless , if vou 'Want me to co the best I can 
with aa d.issent - recoqnizing that quite possib:y I mov not 
ag~ee with it - I will be glad to give it a try . 
The Chief Justlce 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
. #✓y/~ c0~Y' -~ 












From: Justice Blackmun 
Circulated: JUN 1 l 1985 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-589 
PAUL EDMOND DOWLING, PETITIONER v. UNITED 
STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1985] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The National Stolen Property Act provides for the imposi-
tion of criminal penalties upon any person who "transports in · 
interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchan-
dise, securities or money, of the value of § 5000 or more, 
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud." 18 U. S. C. § 2314. In this case, we must deter-
mine whether the statute reaches the interstate transporta-
tion of "bootleg" phonorecords, "stolen, converted or taken 
by fraud" only in the sense that they were manufactured and 
distributed without the consent of the copyright owners of 
the musical compositions performed on the records. 
I 
After a bench trial in the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California conducted largely on the 
basis of a stipulated record, petitioner Paul Edmond Dowling 
was convicted of one count of conspiracy to transport stolen 
property in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 371; eight counts of interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2314; nine counts of copy-
right infringement, in violation of 17 U. S. C. § 506(a); and 
?9~ %wk€ {/7/U/C4t,cd ~ ~ ~tv'l/.7 ~-
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three counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. 1 
The offenses stemmed from an extensive bootleg record oper-
ation involving the manufacture and distribution by mail of 
recordings of vocal performances by Elvis Presley. 2 The ev-
1 Only the § 2314 counts concern us here. Counts Two through Seven of 
the indictment, referring to the statute, charged: 
"On or about the dates listed below and to and from the locations here-
inafter specified, defendants THEAKER arid DOWLING knowingly and 
willfully caused to be transported in interstate commerce phonorecords of a 
value of more than $5000, containing Elvis· Presley performinces of copy-
righted musical compositions, which phonorecords, as the defendants then 
and there well knew, were stolen, converted and taken by fraud, in that 
they were manufactured without the consent of the copyright proprietors." 
App. 6-7. 
A chart then identified six shipments, each from Los Angeles County, Cal., 
to Baltimore, Md., the first dated January 12, 1979, and the last November 
8, 1979. Id., at 7. Counts Eight and Nine of the indictment referred to 
§ 2314 and continued: 
"On or about the dates listed below and to and from the locations herein-
after specified, defendants THEAKER, DOWLING and MINOR know-
ingly and willfully caused to be transported in interstate commerce phono-
records of a value of more than $5000, containing Elvis Presley 
performances of copyrighted musical compositions, which phonorecords, as 
the defendants then and there well knew, were stolen, converted and taken 
by fraud, in that they were manufactured without the consent of the copy-
right proprietors." Id., at 7-8. 
A chart then identified two shipments, each from Los Angeles County, 
Cal., to Miami, Fla., the first dated November 8, 1979, and the second 
June 4, 1979. Id., at 8. 
Dowling's case was severed from that of codefendants William Samuel 
Theaker and Richard Minor. Theaker pleaded guilty to six counts of the 
indictment. Minor was convicted in a separate trial on all counts naming 
him, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
in all respects. United States v. Minor, 756 F. 2d 731 (1985). 
2 A "bootleg" phonorecord is one which contains an unauthorized copy of 
a commercially unreleased performance. As in this case, the bootleg ma-
terial may come from various sources. For example, fans may record con-
cert performances, motion picture soundtracks, or television appearances. 
Outsiders may obtain copies of "outtakes," those portions of the tapes re-
corded in the studio but not included in the "master," that is, the final 
edited version slated for release after transcription to phonorecords or 
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idence demonstrated that sometime around 1976, Dowling, to 
that time an avid collector of Presley recordings, began in 
conjunction with codefendant William Samuel Theaker to 
manufacture phonorecords of unreleased Presley recordings. 
They used material from a variety of sources, including stu-
dio outtakes, acetates, soundtracks from Presley motion pic-
tures, and tapes of Presley concerts and television appear-
ances. 3 Until early 1980, Dowling and Theaker had the 
records manufactured at a record-pressing company in Bur-
bank, Cal. When that company later refused to· take their 
orders, they sought out other record-pressing companies in 
Los Angeles and, through codefendant Richard Minor, in Mi-
ami, Fla. The bootleg entrepreneurs never obtained au-
thorization from or paid royalties to the owners of the copy-
commercial tapes. Or bootleggers may gain possession of an "acetate," 
which is a phonorecord cut with a stylus rather than stamped, capable of 
being played only a few times before wearing out, and utilized to assess 
how a performance will likely sound on a phonorecord. 
Though the terms frequently are used interchangeably, a "bootleg" 
record is not the same as a "pirated" one, the latter being an unauthorized 
copy of a performance already commercially released. 
3 See n. 2, supra. For example, according to the stipulated testimony 
of the Presley archivist at RCA Records, which held the exclusive rights to 
manufacture and distribute sound recordings of Presley performances from 
early in his career through the time of trial in this case, the "Elvis Presley 
Dorsey Shows" contained performances from Presley's appearances on a 
series of six television shows in January, February, and March 1956; "Elvis 
Presley From the Waist Up" contained performances from three appear-
ances on "The Ed Sullivan Show" in September and October 1956 and J anu-
ary 1957; "Plantation Rock" included a version of the title song recorded 
from an acetate, which other testimony indicated Dowling had purchased 
from the author of the song; "The Legend Lives On" included material from 
unreleased master tapes from the RCA Records inventory; "Rockin' with 
Elvis New Year's Eve" derived from a recording by an audience member 
at a 1976 concert in Pittsburgh; and "Elvis on Tour" came from the master 
tape or the film source of the film of the same name. Stipulated Testi-
mony of Joan Deary 24, 25, 35, 37, 40, 44. With the exceptions of "Planta-
tion Rock" and "Elvis on Tour," quantities of each of these albums were 
included in the shipments giving rise to the § 2314 counts. 
4 
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rights in the musical compositions. 4 
In the beginning, Dowling, who resided near Baltimore, 
handled the "artistic" end of the operation, contributing his 
knowledge of the Presley subculture, seeking out and select-
ing the musical material, designing the covers and labels, and 
writing the liner notes, while Theaker, who lived in Los An-
geles and had some familiarity with the music industry, took 
care of the business end, arranging for the record pressings, 
distributing catalogs, and filling orders. In early 1979, how-
ever, having come to suspect that the FBI was investigating 
the West Coast operation, Theaker began making shipments 
by commercial trucking companies of large quantities of the 
albums to Dowling in Maryland. Throughout 1979 and 1980, 
the venturers did their marketing through Send Service, a la-
beling and addressing entity, which distributed at lea.st 
50,000 copies of their catalog and advertising flyers to ad-
dresses on mailing lists provided by Theaker and Dowling. 
Theaker would collect customers' orders from post office 
boxes in Glendale, Cal., and mail them to Dowling in Mary-
land, who would fill the orders. The two did a substantial 
business: the stipulated testimony establishes that through-
out this period Dowling mailed several hundred packages per 
week and regularly spent $1000 per week in postage. The 
'See Stipulation re Copyrights, Royalties and Licenses 111-125, and 
Stipulation re Songs on Albums 127-145. The Copyright Act requires 
record manufacturers to obtain licenses and pay royalties to songwriters 
and publishing companies upon pressing records that contain performances 
of copyrighted musical compositions. 17 U. S. C. § 115. 
While motion-picture copyrights protect the soundtracks of Presley's 
movies, Congress did not extend federal copyright protection to sound re-
cordings until the Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 
391, and then only to sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972. See 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546, 551-552 (1973). Therefore, most 
of the sound recordings involved in this case, as opposed to the musical 
compositions performed, are apparently not protected by copyright. In 
any event, the § 2314 counts rely solely on infringement of copyrights to 
musical compositions. See n. 1, supa. 
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men also had occasion to make large shipments from Los An-
geles to Minor in Miami, who purchased quantities of their 
albums for resale through his own channels. 
The eight § 2314 counts on which Dowling was convicted 
arose out of six shipments of bootleg phonorecords from Los 
Angeles to Baltimore and two shipments from Los Angeles to 
Miami. See n. 1, supra. The evidence- established that 
each shipment included thousands of albums, that each album 
contained performances of copyrighted musical compositions 
on which no royalties had been paid, and that the value of 
each shipment attributable to copyrighted material exceeded 
the statutory minimum. 
Dowling appealed from all the convictions save those for 
copyright infringement, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all respects. 739 F. 
2d 1445 (1984). As to the charges under § 2314, the court re-
lied on its decision in United States v. Belmont, 715 F. 2d 459 
(1983), cert. denied, --U. S. --(1984), where it had held 
that interstate transportation of videotape cassettes contain-
ing unauthorized copies of copyrighted motion pictures in-
volved stolen goods within the meaning of the statute. 5 As 
in Belmont, the court reasoned that the rights of copyright 
owners in their protected property were indistinguishable 
from ownership interests in other types of property and were 
equally deserving of protection. 739 F. 2d, at 1450, quoting 
715 F. 2d, at 461-462. 
We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict 
among the Circuits 6 concerning th~ application of the statute 
•See also United States v. Atherton, 561 F. 2d 747, 752 (CA91977) (mo-
tion pictures); United States v. Drebin, 557 F . 2d 1316, 1328 (CA9 1977) 
(motion pictures), cert. denied, 436 U. S. 904 (1978); United States v. 
Minor, supa (sound recordings). 
6 In United States v. Smith, 686 F. 2d 234 (CA5 1982), the court held 
that interstate transportation of unauthorized copies of copyrighted motion 
pictures recorded "off the air" during television broadcasting did not fall 
within the reach of § 2314. The other courts which have addressed the 
issue have either agreed with the Ninth Circuit that interstate transporta-
6 
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to interstate shipments of bootleg and pirated sound record-
ings and motion pictures whose unauthorized distribution in-
fringed valid copyrights. -- U. S. -- (1985). 
II 
Federal crimes, of course, "are solely creatures of statute." 
Liparota v. United States, -- U. S. --, -- (1985) (slip 
op. 5), citing United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812). 
Accordingly, when assessing the re.ach of a federal criminal 
statute, we must pay close heed to language, legislative his-
tory, and purpose in order strictly to determine the scope 
of the conduct the enactment forbids. Due respect for the 
prerogatives of Congress in defining federal crimes prompts 
restraint in this area, where we typically find a "narrow 
interpretation" appropriate. See Williams v. United States, 
458 U. S. 279, 290 (1982). Chief Justice Marshall early 
observed: 
"The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, 
is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It 
is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of 
individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of 
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial 
department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which 
is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment." United 
States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820). 
tion of copies of infringing motion pictures and sound recordings comes 
within the statute, or assumed the same. See United States v. Drum, 733 
F . 2d 1503, 1505-1506 (CAll) (sound recordings), cert. denied, -- U. S. 
-- (1984); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F. 2d 1517, 1519-1521 (CAll 
1984) (motion pictures); United States v. Whetzel, 191 U. S. App. D. C. 
184, 187, n. 10, 589 F. 2d 707, 710, n. 10 (1978) (sound recordings); United 
States v. Berkwitt, 619 F. 2d 649, 656-658 (CA7 1980) (sound recordings); 
United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 310-314 (SDNY 1983) (sound 
recordings); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 385-391 
(EDNY 1981) (sound recordings). See also United States v. Steerwell Lei-
sure Corp., 598 F. Supp. 171, 174 (WDNY 1984) (video games). 
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Thus, the Court has stressed repeatedly that "' "when choice 
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Con-
gress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose 
the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have 
spoken in language that is clear and definite.""' Williams 
v. United States, 458 U. S., at 290, quoting United States v. 
Bass , 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971), which in turn quotes United 
States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 
221-222 (1952). . . 
A 
Applying that prudent rule of construction here, we exam-
ine at the outset the statutory language. Section 2314 re-
quires, first , that the defendant have transported "goods, 
wares, [or] merchandise" in interstate or foreign commerce; 
. second, that those goods have a value of "$5000 or more"; 
and, third, that the defendant "kno[ w] the same to have been 
stolen, converted or taken by fraud." Dowling does not con-
test that he caused the shipment of goods in interstate com-
merce, or that the shipments pad sufficient value to meet the 
monetary requirement. He argues, instead, that the goods 
shipped were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud." In 
response, the Government does not suggest that Dowling 
wrongfully came by the phonorecords actually shipped or the 
physical materials from which they were made; nor does it 
contend that the objects that Dowling caused to be shipped, 
the bootleg phonorecords, were "the same" as the copyrights 
in the musical compositions that he infringed by unauthorized 
distribution of Presley performances of those compositions. 
The Government argues, however, that the shipments come 
within the reach of § 2314 because the phonorecords physi-
cally embodied performances of musical compositions that 
Dowling had no legal right to distribute. According to the 
Government, the unauthorized use of the musical compo-
sitions rendered the phonorecords "stolen, converted or 
8 
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taken by fraud" within the meaning of the statute. 7 We 
must determine, therefore, whether phonorecords that in-
clude the performance of copyrighted musical compositions 
for the use of which no authorization has been sought nor roy-
alties paid are consequently "stolen, converted or taken by 
7 The Government argues in the alternative that even if the unau-
thorized use of copyrighted musical compositibns does not alone render the 
phonorecords contained in these ship~ents "stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud," the record contains evidence amply. establishing that the bootleg-
gers obtained the source material through illicit means. The Government 
points to testimony, for example, that the custodians of the tapes contain-
ing the outtakes which found their way onto Dowling's records neither au-
thorized their release nor permitted access to them by unauthorized per-
sons. App. 22-23, 34, 38-39, 42-43, 46. According to the Government, 
the wrongfully obtained tapes which contained the musical material should 
be considered "the same" as the phonorecords onto which the sounds were 
transferred, which were therefore "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" 
within the meaning of§ 2314. Cf. United States v. Bottone, 365 F . 2d 389 
(CA2), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 974 (1966). 
For several reasons, we decline to consider this alternative basis for up-
holding Dowling's convictions. The § 2314 counts in the indictment were 
founded exclusively on the allegations that the shipped phonorecords, 
which contained "Elvis Presley performances of copyrighted musical com-
positions," were "stolen, converted and taken by fraud , in that they were 
manufactured without the consent of the copyright proprietors. " Seen. 1, 
supra. The decision of the Court of Appeals does not rely on any theory of 
illegal procurement; it rests solely on a holding that "Dowling's unau-
thorized sale of phonorecords of copyrighted material clearly involved 
'goods, wares or merchandise' within the meaning of the statute." 739 F . 
2d 1445, 1450-1451 (CA9 1984). Moreover, even assuming that the stipu-
lated testimony contained sufficient evidence to establish the unlawful pro-
curement of the source material, the Government made no attempt in the 
District Court to address the difficult problems of valuation under its alter-
native theory. For example, it introduced no evidence that might have 
established the value of the tapes allegedly stolen from the RCA archives, 
nor how that value might relate to the value of the goods ultimately 
shipped. Instead, its evidence concerning the value of the interstate ship-
ments of records attempted to isolate the value attributable to the copy-
righted musical compositions. App. 24-33. Under these circumstances, 
we assess the validity of Dowling's convictions only under the allegations 
made in the indictment. 
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fraud" for purposes of § 2314. We conclude that they are 
not. · 1\ 
The courts interpreting § 2314 have never required, of 
course, that the items stolen and transported remain in en- I 
tirely unaltered form. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 1 
571 F. 2d 154, 158 (CA3) (counterfeit printed Ticketron tick-
ets "the same" as stolen blanks fyom which they were 
printed), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 956 (1978). Nor does it 
matter that the item owes a niajor portion of its value to an 
intangible component. See, e.g., United States v. 
Seagraves, 265 F. 2d 876 (CA3 1959) (geophysical maps iden-
tifying possible oil deposits); United States v. Greenwald, 479 
F . 2d 320 (CA6) (documents bearing secret chemical formu-
lae), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 854 (1973). But these cases and 
others prosecuted under § 2314 have always involved physical 
"goods, wares, [or] merchandise" that have themselves been 
"stolen, converted or taken by fraud." This basic element 
comports with the common-sense meaning of the statutory 
language: by requiring that the "goods, wares, [or] merchan-
dise" be "the same" as those "stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud," the provision seems clearly to contemplate a physical 
identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those 
eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking 
of the subject goods. 
In contrast, the Government's theory here would make 
theft, conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropria-
tion of statutorily protected rights in copyright. The copy-
right owner, however, holds no ordinary chattel. A copy-
right, like other intellectual property, comprises a series of 
carefully defined and carefully delimited interests to which 
the law affords correspondingly exact protections. "Section 
106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights 
to the owner of the copyright," which include the rights "to 
publish, copy, and distribute the author's work." Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, -- V. S. 
-, - (1985) (slip op. 6). See 17 U.S. C. § 106. How-
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ever, "[t]his protection has never accorded the copyright 
owner complete control over all possible uses of his work." 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. --, 
-- (1984) (slip op. 13-14); id., at -- (dissenting opinion) 
(slip op. 7). For example, § 107 of the Copyright Act "codi-
fies the traditional privilege of other auth_ors to make 'fair l 
use' of an earlier writer's work." Harper & Row, supra, at 
-- (slip op. 6). Further, both the ·limitations on the copy-
right holder's rights and the rights themselves have been de-
vised in pursuit of a public goal. "The copyright law, like the 
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary con-
sideration." United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 
334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948). The grants these statutes confer 
are 
"'intended to motivate the creative activity of authors 
and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and 
to allow the public access to the products of their genius 
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.' 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 
417, 429 (1984). 'The monopoly created by copyright 
thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit 
the public.' Id., at 477 (dissenting opinion)." Harper & 
Row, supra, at -- (slip op. 5-6). 
It is apparent, then, that the property rights of a copyright 
holder have a character distinct from the possessory interest 
of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or] merchandise," for 
the copyright holder's dominion is subjected to precisely de-
fined limits and conferred, in the end, in order to ensure con-
tinued incentives to the production of creative works. 
It follows that interference with copyright does not easily 
equate with basic thievery. The Copyright Act defines one 
who misappropriates a copyright as an infringer: "'Anyone 
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner,' that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive do-
main by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work 
in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, 'is an infringer 
' 
JP 4-0' 
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of the copyright.' [17 U.S. C.] §501(a)." Sony Corp., 
supra, at -- (slip op. 15). There is no dispute in this case 
that Dowling's unauthorized inclusion on his bootleg albums 
of performances of copyrighted compositions constituted in-
fringement of those copyrights. Given the fundamentally\\\ 
different character of the property right at issue, however, it J ! I 
is clear that whatever taking occurs ,when an infringer arro- ~ 
gates the use of another's protected work differs markedly\) J 
from the physical removal associated with the -terms em- ) 
ployed by§ 2314. The infringer invades a statutorily defined 
province guaranteed to the copyright holder alone. But he 
does not assume physical control over the copyright; nor does 
he wholly deprive its owner of its use. While one may collo-
quially link infringement with some general notion of wrong-
ful appropriation, infringement plainly implicates a more 
complex set of concerns than does run-of-the-mill theft, con-
version, or fraud. As a result, it fits but awkwardly with the 
language Congress chose-"stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud"-to describe the sorts of goods whose interstate ship-
ment § 2314 makes criminal. "And, when interpreting a 
criminal statute that does not explicitly reach the conduct in 
question, we are reluctant to base an expansive reading on 
inferences drawn from subjective and variable 'understand-
ings."' Williams v. United States, 458 U. S., at 286. 
B 
In light of the ill-fitting language, we turn to consider 
whether the history and purpose of § 2314 evince a plain con-
gressional intention to reach interstate shipments of goods in-
fringing copyrights. Our examination of the background of 
the provision makes more acute our reluctance to read§ 2314 
to encompass merchandise whose contraband character de-
rives from copyright infringement. 
Congress enacted § 2314 as an extension of the National 
Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Pub. L. 70, 41 Stat. 324, currently 
codified at 18 U. S. C. § 2312. Passed in 1919, the earlier 
0'-
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Act was an attempt to supplement the efforts of the States to 
combat automobile thefts. Particularly in areas close to 
state lines/ state law enforcement authorities were seriously 
hampered by car thieves' ability to transport stolen vehicles 
beyond the jurisdiction in which the theft occurred. 9 Legis-
lating pursuant to its commerce power, 10 Congress made un-
lawful the interstate transportation of · stolen vehicles, 
thereby filling in the enforcement gap by "strik[ing] down 
State lines which serve as barriers to protect [these inter-
state criminals] from justice." 58' Cong. Rec. 5476 (1919) 
(statement of Rep. Newton). 11 
Congress acted to fill an identical enforcement gap when in 
1934 it "extend[ ed] the provisions of the National Motor Ve-
hicle Theft Act to other stolen property" by means of the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act. Act of May 22, 1934, 48 Stat. 
794. See S. Rep. No. 538, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934); 
8 See 58 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1919) (statement of Rep. Reavis); id., at 5474 
(statement of Rep. Bee). 
9 See id., at 5471 (1919) (statement of Rep. Dyer) ("State laws upon the 
subject have been inadequate to meet the evil. Thieves steal automobiles 
and take them from one State to another and ofttimes have associates in 
this crime who receive and sell the stolen machines"). 
10 See, e.g., id., at 5471-5472 (statement of Rep. Dyer); id., at 
5475-5476 (statement of Rep. Newton). 
11 This Court has explained: 
"By 1919, the law of most States against local theft had developed so as 
to include not only common-law larceny but embezzlement, false pretenses, 
larceny by trick, and other types of wrongful taking. The advent of the 
automobile , however, created a new problem with which the States found 
it difficult to deal. The automobile was uniquely suited to felonious taking 
whether by larceny, embezzlement or false pretenses. It was a valuable, 
salable article which itself supplied the means for speedy escape. 'The 
automobile [became] the perfect chattel for modern large-scale theft.' 
This challenge could be best met through use of the Federal Government's 
jurisdiction over interstate commerce. The need for federal action in-
creased with the number, distribution and speed of the motor vehicles 
until, by 1919, it became a necessity. The result was the National Motor 
Vehicle Theft Act.'' United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 413-414 
(1957) (footnote omitted). 
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H. R. Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934); H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 1599, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 3 (1934). 
Again, Congress acted under its commerce power to assist 
the States' efforts to combat the "roving criminal," whose 
movement across state lines stymied local law enforcement 
officials. 78 Cong. Rec. 2947 (1934) (statement of Attorney 
General Cummings). 12 As with its progenitor, Congress re-
sponded in the National Stolen Prop.erty Act to "the need for 
federal action" in an area that· normally would ha.Ye been left 
to state law. United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 417 
(1957). 
No such need for supplemental federal action has ever ex-
isted, however, with respect to copyright infringement, for 
the obvious reason that Congress always has had the be-
stowed authority to legislate directly in this area. Article I, 
§ 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall 
have the power 
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." 
By virtue of the explicit constitutional grant, Congress has 
the unquestioned authority to penalize directly the distribu-
tion of goods that infringe copyright, whether or not those 
goods affect interstate commerce. Given that power, it is 
implausible to suppose that Congress intended to combat the 
12 The Attorney General explained: "These criminals have made full use 
of the improved methods of transportation and communication, and have 
taken advantage of the limited jurisdiction possessed by State authorities 
in pursuing fugitive criminals, and of the want of any central coordinating 
agency acting on behalf of all of the States. In pursuing this class of of-
fenders, almost inevitably breakdown of law enforcement results from this 
want of some coordinating and centralized law enforcement agency .... 
[T]he territorial limitations on [local law enforcement authorities'] jurisdic-
tion prevent them from adequately protecting their citizens from this type 
of criminal." 78 Cong. Rec. 2947 (1934). 
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problem of copyright infringement by the circuitous route hy-
pothesized by the Government. See United States v. Smith, 
686 F. 2d 234, 246 (CA5 1982). Of course, the enactment of 
criminal penalties for copyright infringement would not pre-
vent Congress from choosing as well to criminalize the inter-
state shipment of infringing goods. But in dealing with the 
distribution of such goods, Congress has never thought it 
necessary to distinguish between intrastate and interstate 
activity. Nor does any good reason to do so occur to us. In 
sum, the premise of § 2314--the need to fill with federal ac-
tion an enforcement chasm created by limited state jurisdic-
tion-simply does not apply to the conduct the Government 
seeks to reach here. 
C 
The history of copyright infringement provisions affords 
additional reason to hesitate before extending§ 2314 to cover 
the interstate shipments in this case. Not only has Congress 
chiefly relied on an array of civil remedies to provide copy-
right holders protection against infringement, see 17 
U. S. C. §§ 502-505, but in exercising its power to render 
criminal certain forms of copyright infringement, it has acted 
with exceeding caution. 
The first full-fledged criminal provisions appeared in the 
Copyright Act of 1909, and specified that misdemeanor penal-
ties of up to one year in jail or a fine between $100 and $1000, 
or both, be imposed upon "[a]ny person who willfully and for 
profit" infringed a protected copyright. 13 This provision was 
13 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 28, 35 Stat. 1082. 
Congress first provided criminal penalties for copyright infringement in 
the Act of January 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481, which made a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by imprisonment for one year of the unlawful performance or pres-
entation, done willfully and for profit, of a copyrighted dramatic or musical 
composition. See also Act of May 31, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124 (fixed civil pen-
alties, one-half payable to the United States, for unauthorized copying of 
copyrighted book, chart, or map). See generally Young, Criminal Copy-
right Infringement and a Step Beyond, reprinted in ASCAP Copyright 
Law Symposium Number Thirty 157 (1983); Gawthrop, An Inquiry Into 
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little used. In 1974, however, Congress amended the sec-
tion, by then 17 U. S. C. § 104 by virtue of the 1947 revi-
sion, 14 substantially to increase penalties for record piracy. 15 
The new version retained the existing language, but supple-
mented it with a new subsection (b), which provided that one 
who "willfully and for profit" infringed a copyright in sound 
recordings would be subject to a fine of up to $25,000 or 
imprisonment for up to one year,· or both. 17 U. S. C. 
§ 104(b) (1975 ed., Supp. V). 16• The legislative· hi.story dem-
onstrates that in increasing the penalties available for this 
category of infringement, Congress carefully calibrated the 
penalty to the problem: it had come to recognize that "record 
piracy is so profitable that ordinary penalties fail to deter 
prospective offenders." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1581, p. 4 
(1974). Even so, because it considered record piracy primar-
ily an economic offense, Congress, after serious consider-
ation, rejected a proposal to increase the available term of 
imprisonment to three years for a first offense and seven 
years for a subsequent offense. Ibid. 
When in 1976, after more than 20 years of study, Congress 
adopted a comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act, see 
Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, -- U. S. --, -----
(1985) (slip op. 5-7); Sony Corp., 464 U. S., at-, n. 9 (dis-
senting opinion) (slip op. 7), it again altered the scope of the 
criminal infringement actions, albeit cautiously. Section 
506(a) of the new Act provided: 
"Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and 
for purposes of commercial advantage or private finan-
cial gain shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
Criminal Copyright Infringement, reprinted in ASCAP Copyright Law 
Symposium Number Twenty 154 (1972). 
14 Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. 80-281, 61 Stat. 652. 
15 Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873. 
1
• A second violation subjected the offender to a fine of up to $50,000 or 
imprisonment for not more than two years, or both. 17 U. S. C. § 104(b) 
(1975 ed., Supp. V). See H. R. Rep. No. 93-1581, p. 4 (1974). 
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oned for not more than one year, or both: Provided, how-
ever, that any person who infringes willfully and for 
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain the copyright in a sound recording afforded by sub-
sections (1), (2), or (3) of section 106 or the copyright in a 
motion picture afforded by subsection (1), (3), or (4) of 
section 106 shall be fined not more than $25,000 or im-
prisoned for not more than one year, or both, for the first 
such offense and shall be -fined not more than $50,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than two years, or both, for any 
subsequent offense." 17 U. S. C. § 506(a) (1976 ed.). 
Two features of this provision are noteworthy: first, Con-
gress extended to motion pictures the enhanced penalties ap-
plicable by virtue of prior § 104 to infringement of rights in 
sound recordings; and, second, Congress specified the precise 
infringing uses that could give rise to this enhanced liability. 
It is also noteworthy that despite the urging of represent-
atives of the film industry, see Copyright Law Revision: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 716 (1975) (state-
ment of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture 
Association of America, Inc.), and the initial inclination of the 
Senate, see S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 146 (1975), Congress de-
clined once again to provide felony penalties for copyright in-
fringement involving sound recordings and motion pictures. 
Finally, by the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, Congress chose to 
address the problem of bootlegging and piracy of records, 
tapes, and films by imposing felony penalties on such activi-
ties. Section 5 of the 1982 Act revised 17 U. S. C. § 506(a) to 
provide that "[a]ny person who infringes a copyright willfully 
and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain shall be punished as provided in section 2319 of title 18." 
Section 2319(b)(l), in turn, was then enacted to provide for a 
fine of up to $250,000, or imprisonment of up to five years, or 
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both, if the offense "involves the reproduction or distribution, 
during any one-hundred-and-eighty-day period, of at least 
one thousand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright 
in one or more sound recordings [or] at least sixty-five copies 
infringing the copyright in one or more motion pictures or 
other audiovisual works." Subsection (b)(2) provides for a 
similar fine and up to two years' imprisonment if the offense 
involves "more than one hundred but less than one thousand 
phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or 
more sound recordings [or] more than seven but less than 
sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in one or more mo-
tion pictures or other audiovisual works." And subsection 
(b)(3) provides for a fine of not more that $25,000 and up to 
one year's imprisonment in any other case of willful infringe-
ment. The legislative history indicates that Congress set \ 
out from a belief that the existing misdemeanor penalties for 
1 copyright infringement were simply inadequate to deter the v 
enormously lucrative activities of large-scale bootleggers and 
pirates. See 128 Cong. Rec. H1951 (May 10, 1982) (remarks 
of Rep. Kastenmeier); The Piracy and Counterfeiting 
Amendments Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 691 Before the Sub-
committee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1981) (statement of Renee 
L. Szybala, Special Assistant to the Associate Attorney Gen-
eral). Accordingly, it acted to "strengthen the laws against I 
record, tape, and film piracy" by "increas[ing] the penalties 
. . . for copyright infringements involving such products," \ 
thereby "bring[ing] the penalties_Jor record and film piracy \ 
. . . into line with the enormous profits which are being 
reaped from such activities." S. Rep. No. 97-274, pp. 1, 7 
(1981). 17 
Thus, the history of the criminal infringement provisions of 
the Copyright Act reveals a good deal of care on Congress' 
17 The Act also substantially increased penalties for trafficking in coun-
terfeit labels affixed to sound recordings, motion pictures, and other audio-
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part before subjecting copyright infringement to serious 
criminal penalties. First, Congress hesitated long before 
imposing felony sanctions on copyright infringers. Second, 
when it did so, it carefully chose those areas of infringement 
that required severe response, and studiously graded penal-
ties even in those areas of heightened concern. This step-
by-step, carefully considered approach is consistent with 
Congress' traditional sensitivity to the special concerns impli-
cated by the copyright laws. . . 
In stark contrast, the Government's theory of this case 
presupposes a congressional decision to bring the felony pro-
visions of § 2314, which make available the comparatively 
light fine of not more than $10,000 but the relatively harsh 
term of imprisonment of up to 10 years, to bear on the distri-
bution of a sufficient quantity of any infringing goods simply 
because of the presence here of a factor-interstate transpor-
tation-not otherwise thought relevant to copyright law. 
The Government thereby presumes congressional adoption of 
an indirect but blunderbuss solution to a problem treated 
with precision when considered directly. To the contrary, 
the discrepancy between the two approaches convinces us 
that Congress had no intention to reach copyright infringe-
ment when it enacted § 2314. 
D 
The broad consequences of the Government's theory, both 
in the field of copyright and in kindred fields of intellectual 
property law, provide a final and dispositive factor against 
reading § 2314 in the manner suggested. For example, in 
Harper & Row, supra, this Court very recently held that The 
Nation, a weekly magazine of political commentary, had in-
fringed former President Ford's copyright in the unpublished 
manuscript of his memoirs by . verbatim excerpting of some 
300 words from the work. It rejected The Nation's argu-
ment that the excerpting constituted fair use. Presented 
with the facts of that case as a hypothetical at oral argument 
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in the present litigation, the Government conceded that its 
theory of § 2314 would permit prosecution of the magazine if 
it transported copies of sufficient value across state lines. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. Whatever the wisdom or propriety of 
The Nation's decision to publish the excerpts, we would 
pause, in the absence of any explicit indication of congres-
sional intention, to bring such conduct within the purview of 
a criminal statute making available· felony penalties for the 
interstate transportation of goods "stolen, converted or taken 
by fraud." 
Likewise, the field of copyright does not cabin the Govern-
ment's theory, which would as easily encompass the law of 
patents and any other form of intellectual property. If "the 
intangible idea protected by the copyright is effectively made 
tangible by its embodiment upon the tapes," United States v. 
Gottesman, 724 F. 2d 1517, 1520 (CAll 1984), phonorecords, 
or films shipped in interstate commerce as to render those 
items stolen goods for purposes of § 2314, so too would the 
intangible idea protected by a patent be made tangible by its 
embodiment in an article manufactured in accord with pat-
ented specifications. Thus,, as the Government as much as 
acknowledged at argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, its view of 
the statute would readily permit its application to interstate 
shipments of patent-infringing goods. Despite its un-
doubted power to do so, however, Congress has not provided 
criminal penalties for distribution of goods infringing valid 
patents. 18 Thus, the rationale supporting application of the 
18 Congress instead has relied on provisions affording patent owners a 
civil cause of action. 35 U. S. C. §§ 281-294. Among the available reme-
dies are treble damages for willful infringement. § 284; see, e. g. , A meri-
can Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 415 F . 2d 373, 378-379 (CA2 1969), cert. 
denied, 396 U. S. 1038 (1970). See generally 2 P. Rosenberg, Patent Law 
Fundamentals§ 17.08 (2d ed. 1984). The only criminal provision relating 
to patents is 18 U. S. C. § 497, which proscribes the forgery, counterfeit-
ing, or false alteration of letters patent, or the uttering thereof. See also 
35 U. S. C. § 292 ($500 penalty, one-half to go to person suing and one-half 
to the United States, for false marking of patent status). 
20 
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statute under the circumstances of this case would equally 
justify its use in wide expanses of the law which Congress has 
evidenced no intention to enter by way of criminal sanction. 19 
This factor militates strongly against the reading proffered 
by the Government. Cf. Williams v. United States, 458 
U. S., at 287. 
III 
No more than other legislation do criminal statutes take on 
straightjackets upon enactment. _In sanctioning the use of 
§ 2314 in the manner urged by the Government here, the 
Courts of Appeals understandably have sought to utilize an 
existing and readily available tool to combat the increasingly 
serious problem of bootlegging, piracy, and copyright in-
fringement. Nevertheless, the deliberation with which Con-
gress over the last decade has addressed the problem of copy-
right infringement for profit, as well as the precision with 
which it has chosen to apply criminal penalties in this area, 
demonstrates anew the wisdom of leaving it to the legislature 
to define crime and prescribe penalties. 20 Here, the Ian-
19 The Government's rationale would also apply to goods infringing 
trademark rights. Yet, despite having long and extensively legislated in 
this area, see federal Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1051 et seq., in the modern era Congress only ·recently has resorted to 
criminal sanctions to control trademark infringement. See Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, ch. XV, 98 Stat. 2178. See 
also S. Rep. No. 98-526, pp. 1-2, 5 (1984); 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and 
Unfair Competition § 30.39 (2d ed. 1984). 
20 Indeed, in opposing the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, the 
Government acknowledged that it no longer needs § 2314 to prosecute and 
punish serious copyright infringement. Adverting to the most recent con-
gressional copyright action, it advised the Court: 
"[A]pplication of Section 2314 ... to the sort of conduct involved in this 
case is of considerably diminished significance since passage, subsequent to 
the offenses involved in this case, of the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amend-
ments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 et seq. (codified at 17 
U. S. C. 506(a) and 18 U. S. C. 2318, 2319). The new statute provides for 
felony treatment for most serious cases of copyright infringement involving 
sound recordings and audiovisual materials and trafficking in counterfeit 
.. 
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guage of§ 2314 does not "plainly and unmistakably" cover pe-
titioner Dowling's conduct, United States v. Lacher, 134 
U. S. 624, 628 (1890); the purpose of the provision to fill gaps 
in state law enforcement does not couch the problem under 
attack; and the rationale employed to apply the statute to pe-
titioner's conduct would support its extension to significant 
bodies of law that Congress gave no indication it intended to 
touch. In sum, Congress has not spoken with the requisite 
clarity. Invoking the "time-honored interpretiv~ guideline" 
that "'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes 
should be resolved in favor of lenity,"' Liparota v. United 
States, -- V. S. --, -- (1985) (slip op. 8), quoting 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), we reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
labels, while prior law provided only for misdemeanor treatment for first 
offenses under the copyright statutes. In view of the increased penalties 
provided under the new statute, prosecutors are likely to have less occa-
sion to invoke other criminal statutes in connection with copyright infring-
ing activity." Brief for the United States in Opposition 8. 
These observations suggest the conclusion we have reached-that § 2314 
was not in the first place the proper means by which to counter the spread 
of copyright infringement in sound recordings and motion pictures. 
-
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M-~ 
The Court invokes the familiar rule that a criminal 
statute is to be construed narrowly. This rule is 
intended to assure fair warning to the public, e. g., 
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); McBoyle 
v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931), and is applied 
when statutory language is ambiguous or inadequate to put 
persons on notice of what the legislature has made a 
crime. See, e. g., United States v. Bass, supra; Rewis v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United 
States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). I disagree not with these 
principles, but with 
As I read § 2 3 14 , i t 
broad. The statute 
their application to this statute. 
is not ambiguous, but simply very 
punishes individuals who transport 
2. 
goods, wares, or merchandise worth $5,000 or more, knowing 
"the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by 
fraud." 18 u.s.c. §2314. As noted above, this Court has 
given the terms "stolen" and "converted" broad meaning in 
the past. The petitioner could not have had any doubt 
that he was committing a theft as well as defrauding the 
copyright owner. 1 
The Court also emphasizes the fact that the 
copyright laws contain their own penalties for violation 
of their terms. But the fact that particular conduct may 
violate more than one federal law does not foreclose the 
Government from making a choice as to which of the 
statutes should be the basis for an indictment. "The 
Court has long recognized that when an act viola t~s more 
than one er iminal statute, the Government may prosecute 
under either so long as it does not discriminate against 
any class of defendants." United States v. Batchelder, 442 
1 rndeed, there was stipulated testimony by a former 
employee of petitioner's, himself an unindicted co-conspirator, 
that petitioner and his ?artner "were wary of any unusually large 
record orders, because they could be charged with an interstate 
transportation of stolen property if they shipped more than 
$5,000 worth of records." App. at Al9 (Stipulation Regarding 
Testimony of Aca "Ace" Anderson). 
. 3. 
U.S. 114, 123-124 (1979). 




Dowling v. United States 
No. 84-589 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds today that §2314 does not apply to 
this case because the rights of a copyright holder are 
"different" from the rights of owners of other kinds of 
property. The Court does not explain, however, how the 
differences it identifies are relevant either under the 
language of §2314 or in terms of the purposes of the 
statute. Because I believe that the language of §2314 
2. 
,. 
fairly covers the interstate transportation of goods 
containing unauthorized use of copyrighted material, I 
dissent. 
Section 2314 provides for criminal penalties against 
any person who "transports in interstate or foreign 
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or 
1 
money, of the value of $f Oo or more, knowing the same to 
have been stolen, converted T or taken by fraud." 18 
u.s.c. §2314. There is no dispute that the items Dowling 
transported in interstate commerce bootleg Elvis 
Presley records -- are goods, wares, or merchandise. Nor 
is there a dispute that the records contained copyrighted 
Elvis Presley performances that Dowling had no right to 
reproduce and distribute. The only issue here is whether 
,, 
the unauthorized use of a copyright may be "equate[d] with"v" 
3. 
,, -- -::-i.ul w;~ 
II ~ (' _,. , '" ,, 
tr( ~' ~WN, ~ ~ 
basic thievery for purposes of §2314. Ante, at 10. 
Virtually every court that has considered the question has 
concluded that §2314 is broad enough to cover activities 
such as Dowling' s. See, e. g., United States v. Drum, 
733 F.2d 1503, 1505-06 (CAll), cert denied, U.S. 
(1984); United States v. Whetzel, 191 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 
187, n. 10, 589 F.2d 707, 710, n. 10 (1978); United States 
v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649, 656-658 (CA7 1980); United 
States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 385-391 (EDNY 
~~ 
1981). ~ United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234 (CA5 
1982). The Court's reasons for holding otherwise are not 
persuasive. 
The Court focuses on the fact that "f:} e copyright 
A.. 
✓ 
owner .•. holds no ordinary cl:lattel." Ante, at 9. The 
·~ ~ 
Court quite correctly notes that a copyrigh \ "comprise ,Aof 
4. 
carefully defined and carefully delimited interests," 
ibid., and that the copyright owner does not enjoy 
"'complete control over all possible uses of his work,•" 
-t 
id., at 10, quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Sµdios, - / 
Inc., 464 U.S. ___ , (1984) (slip op. at 13-14). But 
among the rights a copyright owner enjoys is the right to 
publish, copy, and distribute the copyrighted work. 
Indeed, these rights define virtually the entire scope of 
an owner's rights in intangible property such as a 
copyright. Interference with these rights may be 
"different" from the physical removal of tangible objects, 
but it not clear why this difference matters under the 
terms of §2314. The statute makes no distinction between 
tangible and intangible property. The basic goal of the 
National Stolen Property Act, thwarting the interstate 
5. 
transportation of misappropriated goods, is not served by 
the judicial imposition of this distinction. Although the 
rights of copyright owners in their property may be more 
limited than those of owners of other kinds of property, 
they are surely "just as deserving of protection •••. " 
~,A.t 
United States v. Drum, ~ 15 O 60 ~ 
The Court concedes that §2314 has never been 
interpreted to require that the goods, wares, or 
merchandise stolen and transported in violation of the 
statute remain in unaltered form. Ante, at 9. See also 
United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 
~ 
393 A(CA2 1966). 
It likewise recognizes that the statute is applicable even 
whe~ the misappropriated i tern "owes a major portion of 
its value to an intangible component." Ante, at 9. The 
difficulty the Court finds with the application of §2314 
6. 
here is in finding a theft, conversion, or fraudulent 
taking, in light of the intangible nature of a copyright. 
~ 
But t-h-e CG~rt¼ difficulty, it seems to me, has more to do 
~ 
with its views on the relative evil of copyright 
infringement versus other kinds of thievery, than it does 
with interpretation of the statutory language. 
The statutory terms at issue here, i. e., "stolen, 
converted taken by fraud," traditionally have been 
given broad scope by the courts. For example, in United 
States v. Turley, 352 u.s. 407 this Court held 
that the term "stolen" included all felonious takings with 
intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of 
ownership, regardless of whether the theft ould 
x&. ar q.11. _, 
constitute larceny at common law. Similarly, in 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the 
7. 
Court stated that conversion "may be consummated without 
any intent to keep and without any wrongfu l taking, where 
the initial possession by the converter was entirely 
lawful. Conversion may include misuse or abuse of 
property. It may reach use in an unauthorized manner or 
to an unauthorized extent of property placed in one's 
custody for limited use." Id., at 271-272. 
Dowling's unauthorized duplication and commercial 
exploitation of the copyrighted performances were intended 
( Q1Y-D~ -lo) ~ 
to gain for himself the rights and benefits lawfully 
reserved to the copyright owner. Under Turley, supra, his 
acts should be viewed as the theft of these performances. 
Likewise, Dowling's acts constitute the unauthorized use 
as converl,itM 
of another's property and are fairly cognizableA under the 
Co u r t ' s def i n i ti on ,:,,,f 11 11 up , "d I'"\ 
~ 
in Mor ~ ette. 
8. 
Finally, Congress implicitly has approved the 
Government's use of §2314 to reach conduct like Dowling's. 
~ n adopting the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act 
of 1982, Pub. L. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, Congress was aware 
that §2314 was being used to prosecute those who made 
large interstate shipments of pirated goods. Sees. Rep. 
97-274, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981); The Piracy and 
Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1981: Hearings on s. 691 
~ 
~fore the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 & n. 
5 (1981) J There is no indication that Congress 
disapproved of this use of §2314. Indeed, Congress 
provided that the new penalties adopted in the 1982 Act 
"shall be in addition to any other provisions of title 17 
or any other law." 18 u.s.c. §2319(a) (emphasis added). 
9. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee specifically added the 
italicized language to clarify that the new provision 
"supplement [s] existing remedies contained in copyright i 
law or any other law." s. Rep. No. 274, 97th Cong., 2d -- v-
(tqC'.2)(). 
Sess. 2 ~ epr:inted in 1982 u.s. Code Cong. & Ad. News 127 ;z5 
' ~ U1Ut5 ~ JJML ~ :t~/4- .fz, ~ ~ 
,_ lemeha ~ dded) . f,1~;:t ::_1:;:,:.+11h~ 
-o f §Bi'! to ~ rnent o f--geeds contain i ng 
pn·«ro ./ltl.,~f-1 "1 P.'4 ~ ~"'1 ~ ,1ci-. 
unatttimrtze-d---ase o f copy r iqh t ed ma t eria l ~ By choosing to 
k . f 1 ' . 1 1 ~sl. . tl ma e its new e ony provisions supp ementa ,  imp ici y 
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by the vast majority of courts that have considered the 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 19, 1985 
Re: No. 84-589-Dowling v. United States 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: June 20, 985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-589 Dowling v. U.S. 
The Court opinion relies on the rule of "strict or 
narrow constuction of criminal laws". There must be deci-
sions that say the strict construction rule applies only (or 
particularly) where the statutory language identifying or 
defining the criminal conduct is ambiguous or not readily 
understandable by the public. The purpose of the rule is to 
make sure that the public is fairly warned. 
If there are cases helpful in this respect, per-
haps we could say something along the following lines: 
"The Court emphasizes the familiar rule that a 
criminal statute is to be construed narrowly. This rule is 
intended to assure fair warning to the public, and is ap-
plied where the language making certain conduct criminal is 
ambiguous or inadequate to put persons on notice of a crimi-
nal violation. In this case §2314 proscribes the transport-
ing in commerce of 'any goods, wares, merchandise*** 
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud.' It is conceded that the Presley records transported 
by petitioner came within the language 'goods, wares, or 
merchandise'. As we have noted above, the only issue is 
whether this use of copyrighted material fairly may be 
viewed as constituting a 'theft, conversion, or fraud'. It 
t 
2. 
seems to me that the language hardly could be stated more 
broadly or that petitioner could have had any doubt that he 
was committing a theft as well as defrauding the copyright 
owner. This has been the view of every court, with one ex-
ception, that has considered this question. See cases cited 
supra. 
The Court perceives a distinction between the theft 
of copyrighted material and the defrauding of the owner of 
such material as somehow being different from stealing other 
types of property. Reliance is placed particularly on the 
fact that the copyright laws also provide for penalties 
where copyrighted material is pirated. But the fact that 
particular conduct may violate more than one federal law 
does not foreclose the government from making a choice as to 
which of the two statutes should be the basis for an indict-
ment (Annmarie: Are there not cases to this effect?)" 
Annmarie: Without having taken a second look at 
Harry's opinion or the statutes, are the penalties 
different? Has the statute of limitations run against pur-
suing the copyright remedy? Does the SG's brief give any 
reason why the government proceeded under §2314 rather than 
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I will wait on the dissent. 
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From: Justice Powell 
JUN 2 1 1985 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-589 
PAUL EDMOND DOWLING, PETITIONER v. UNITED 
STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds today that § 2314 does not apply to this 
case because the rights of a copyright holder are "different" 
from the rights of owners of other kinds of property. The 
Court does not explain, however, how the differences it iden-
tifies are relevant either under the language of§ 2314 or in 
terms of the purposes of the statute. Because I believe that 
the language of§ 2314 fairly covers the interstate transporta-
tion of goods containing unauthorized use of copyrighted ma-
terial, I dissent. 
Section 2314 provides for criminal penalties against any 
person who "transports in interstate or foreign commerce 
any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the 
value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been 
stolen, converted or taken by fraud." 18 U. S. C. § 2314. 
There is no dispute that the items Dowling transported in 
interstate commerce--bootleg Elvis Presley records-are 
goods, wares, or merchandise. Nor is there a dispute that 
the records contained copyrighted Elvis Presley perform-
ances that Dowling had no right to reproduce and distribute. 
The only issue here is whether the unauthorized use of a 
copyright may be "equate[d] with theft, conversion, or fraud" 
for purposes of§ 2314. Ante, at 10. Virtually every court 
that has considered the question has concluded that § 2314 is 




DOWLING v. UNITED STATES 
-
e.g., United States v. Drum, 733 F. 2d 1503, 1505-06 
(CAll), cert denied, -- U. S. -- (1984); United States v . 
Whetzel, 191 U. S. App. D. C. 184, 187, n. 10, 589 F. 2d 707, 
710, n. 10 (1978); United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F. 2d 649, 
656-658 (CA7 1980); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc ., 506 
F. Supp. 380, 385-391 (EDNY 1981). The only case cited by 
the Court that lends support to its holding is United States v. 
Smith;· 686 F. 2d 234 (CA5 1982). 1 The Court's decision 
today is thus contrary to the clear weight of authority. 
The Court focuses on the fact that "[t]he copyright owner 
. . . holds no ordinary chattel." Ante, at 9. The Court 
quite correctly notes that a copyright is "comprise[d] ... of 
carefully defined and carefully delimited interests," ibid., and 
that the copytight owner does not enjoy "'complete control 
over all possible uses of his work,"' id., at 10, quoting Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. --, --
(1984) (slip op. at 13-14). But among the rights a copyright 
owner enjoys is the right to publish, copy, and distribute the 
copyrighted work. Indeed, these rights define virtually the 
entire scope of an owner's rights in intangible property such 
as a copyright. Interference with these rights may be "dif-
ferent" from the physical removal of tangible objects, but it 
not clear why this difference matters under the terms of 
§ 2314. The statute makes no distinction between tangible 
and intangible property. The basic goal of the National Sto-
len Property Act, thwarting the interstate transportation of 
misappropriated goods, is not served by the judicial imposi-
tion of this distinction. Although the rights of copyright 
owners in their property may be more limited than those of 
1 In United States v. Drum, 733 F . 2d 1503 (CAll), cert. denied, --
U. S. -- (1984), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered 
and rejected the arguments offered in United States v. Smith, 686 F. 2d 
234 (CA5 1982) and reiterated by the Court today. I agree with Drum 
that neither the language nor purpose of § 2314 support; the view that the 
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3 
owners of other kinds of property, they are surely "just as 
deserving of protection .... " United States v. Drum, 
supra, at 1506. 
The Court concedes that § 2314 has never been inter·preted 
to require that the goods, wares, or merchandise stolen and 
transported in violation of the statute remain in unaltered 
form. •· Ante, at 9. See also United States v. Bottone, 365 F. 
2d 389, 393-394 (CA2 1966). It likewise recognizes that the 
statute is applicable even when the misappropriated item 
"owes a major portion of its value to an intangible compo-
nent." Ante, at 9. The difficulty the Court finds with the 
application of § 2314 here is in finding a theft, conversion, or 
fraudulent taking, in light of the intangible nature of a copy-
right. But this difficulty, it seems to me, has more to do 
with its views on the relative evil of copyright infringement 
versus other kinds of thievery, than it does with interpreta-
tion of the statutory language. 
The statutory terms at issue here, i. e., "stolen, converted 
or taken by fraud," traditionally have been given broad scope 
by the courts. For example, in United States v. Turley, 352 
U. S. 407 (1957), this Court held that the term "stolen" in-
cluded all felonious takings with intent to deprive the owner 
of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of 
whether the theft would constitute larceny at common law. 
Id., at 417. Similarly, in Morissette v. United States, 342 
U. S. 246 (1952), the Court stated that conversion "may be 
consummated without any intent to keep and without any 
wrongful taking, where the initial possession by the con-
verter was entirely lawful. Conversion may include misuse 
or abuse of property. It may reach use in an unauthorized 
manner or to an unauthorized extent of property placed in 
one's custody for limited use." Id. , at 271-272. 
Dowling's unauthorized duplication and commercial ex-
ploitation · of the copyrighted performances were intended to 
gain for himself the rights and benefits lawfully reserved to 
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be viewed as the theft of these performances. Likewise, 
Dowling's acts constitute the unauthorized use of another's 
property and are fairly cognizable as conversion under the 
Court's definition in Morissette. 
The Court invokes the familiar rule that a criminal statute 
is to be construed narrowly. This rule is intended to assure 
fair warning to the public, e. g., United States v. Bass, 404 
U. S. 336, 348 (1971); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 
25, 27 (1931), and is applied when statutory language is 
ambiguous or inadequate to put persons on notice of what the 
legislature has made a crime. See, e. g., United States v. 
Bass, supra; Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 
(1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83 (1955). I dis-
agree not with these principles, but with their application to 
this statute. As I read § 231.4, it is not ambiguous, but sim-
ply very broad. The statute punishes individuals who trans-
port goods, wares, or merchandise worth $5,000 or more, 
knowing "the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken 
by fraud." 18 U. S. C. § 2314. As noted above, this Court 
has given the terms "stolen" and "converted" broad meaning 
in the past. The petitioner could not have had any doubt 
that he was committing a theft as well as defrauding the 
copyright owner. 2 
The Court also emphasizes the fact that the copyright laws 
contain their own penalties for violation of their terms. But 
the fact that particular conduct may violate more than one 
federal law does not foreclose the Government from making a 
choice as to which of the statutes should be the basis for an 
indictment. "The Court has long recognized that when an 
act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government 
2 Indeed, there was stipulated testimony by a former employee of peti-
tioner's, himself an unindicted co-conspirator, that petitioner and his part-
ner "were wary of any unusually large record orders, because they could be 
charged with an interstate transportation of stolen property if they 
shipped more than $5,000 worth ofrecords." App. at A19 (Stipulation Re-
garding Testimony of Aca "Ace" Anderson). 
~ -
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may prosecute under either so long as it does not discrimi-
nate against any class of defendants." United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 123-124 (1979). 
Finally, Congress implicitly has approved the Govern-
ment's use of § 2314 to reach conduct like Dowling's. In 
adopting the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 
1982, Pub. L. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, Congress provided that the 
new penalties "shall be in addition to any other provisions of 
title 17 or any other law." 18 U. S. C. § 2319(a) (emphasis 
added). The Senate Judiciary Committee specifically added 
the italicized language to clarify that the new provision "sup-
plement[s] existing remedies contained in copyright law or 
any other law." S. Rep. No. 274, 97th Cong. , 2d Sess. 2 
(emphasis added). Many courts had used§ 2314 to reach the 
shipment of goods containing unauthorized use of copy-
righted material prior to the enactment of the Piracy and 
Counterfeiting Amendments Act. By choosing to make its 
new felony provisions supplemental, Congress implicitly con-
sented to continued application of § 2314 to these offenses. 
Dowling and his partners "could not have doubted the 
criminal nature of their conduct .. .. " United States v. 
Bottone, supra, at 394. His claim that § 2314 does not reach 
his clearly unlawful use of copyrighted performances evinces 
"the sort of sterile formality" properly rejected by the vast 
majority of courts that have considered the question. 
United States v. Belmont, 715 F. 2d 459, 462 (CA9 1983). 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
- -
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
j,u.vi-.emt QJ:o-urt o-f tlrt ~.@ j,tattg 
~lp:nghtn,~.QJ:. 20ffe~, 
June 24, 1985 
84-589 - Dowling v. United States 
Dear Lewis, 
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3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-589 
PAUL EDMOND DOWLING, PETITIONER v. UNITED 
STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June 28, 1985] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The National Stolen Property Act provides for the imposi-
tion of criminal penalties upon any person who "transports in 
interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchan-
dise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, 
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud." 18 U. S. C. § 2314. In this case, we must deter-
mine whether the statute reaches the interstate transporta-
tion of "bootleg" phonorecords, "stolen, converted or taken 
by fraud" only in the sense that they were manufactured and 
distributed without the consent of the copyright owners of 
the musical compositions performed on the records. 
I 
After a bench trial in the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California conducted largely on the 
basis of a stipulated record, petitioner Paul Edmond Dowling 
was convicted of one count of conspiracy to transport stolen 
property in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 371; eight counts of interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2314; nine counts of cop~ 
right infringement, in violation of 17 U. S. C. § 506(a); and 
~#t~ 
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three counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. 1 
The offenses stemmed from an extensive bootleg record oper-
ation involving the manufacture and distribution by mail of 
recordings of vocal performances by Elvis Presley. 2 The ev-
1 Only the § 2314 counts concern us here. Counts Two through Seven of 
the indictment, referring to the statute, charged: 
"On or about the dates listed below and to and from the locations here-
inafter specified, defendants THEAKER and DOWLING knowingly and 
willfuliy caused to be transported in interstate commerce phonorecords of a 
value of more than $5,000, containing Elvis Presley performances of copy-
righted musical compositions, which phonorecords, as the defendants then 
and there well knew, were stolen, converted and taken by fraud, in that 
they were manufactured without the consent of the copyright proprietors." 
App. 6-7. 
A chart then identified six shipments, each from Los Angeles County, Cal., 
to Baltimore, Md., the first dated January 12, 1979, and the last November 
8, 1979. Id., at 7. Counts Eight and Nine of the indictment referred to 
§ 2314 and continued: 
"On or about the dates listed below and to and from the locations herein-
after specified, defendants THEAKER, DOWLING and MINOR know-
ingly and willfully caused to be transported in interstate commerce phono-
records of a value of more than $5,000, containing Elvis Presley 
performances of copyrighted musical compositions, which phonorecords, as 
the defendants then and there well knew, were stolen, converted and taken 
by fraud, in that they were manufactured without the consent of the copy-
right proprietors." Id., at 7-8. 
A chart then identified two shipments, each from Los Angeles County, 
Cal., to Miami, Fla., the first dated November 8, 1979, and the second 
June 4, 1979. Id., at 8. 
Dowling's case was severed from that of codefendants William Samuel 
Theaker and Richard Minor. Theaker pleaded guilty to six counts of the 
indictment. Brief for United States 2, n. 1. Minor was convicted in a \ 
separate trial on all counts naming him, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all respects. United States v. 
Minor, 756 F. 2d 731 (1985). 
2 A "bootleg" phonorecord is one which contains an unauthorized copy of 
a commercially unreleased performance. As in this case, the bootleg ma-
terial may come from various sources. For example, fans may record con-
cert performances, motion picture soundtracks, or television appearances. 
Outsiders may obtain copies of "outtakes," those portions of the tapes re-
corded in the studio but not included in the "master," that is, the final 
-
84-589---OPINION 
DOWLING v. UNITED STATES 
-
3 
idence demonstrated that sometime around 1976, Dowling, to 
that time an avid collector of Presley recordings, began in 
conjunction with codefendant William Samuel Theaker to 
manufacture phonorecords of unreleased Presley recordings. 
They used material from a variety of sources, including stu-
dio outtakes, acetates, soundtracks from Presley motion pic-
tures, and tapes of Presley concerts and television appear-
ances. 3 Until early 1980, Dowling and Theaker had the 
records manufactured at a record-pressing company in Bur-
bank, Cal. When that company later refused to take their 
orders, they sought out other record-pressing companies in 
Los Angeles and, through codefendant Richard Minor, in Mi-
ami, Fla. The bootleg entrepreneurs never obtained au-
edited version slated for release after transcription to phonorecords or 
commercial tapes. Or bootleggers may gain possession of an "acetate," 
which is a phonorecord cut with a stylus rather than stamped, capable of 
being played only a few times before wearing out, and utilized to assess 
how·a performance will likely sound on a phonorecord. 
Though the terms frequently are used interchangeably, a "bootleg" 
record is not the same as a "pirated" one, the latter being an unauthorized 
copy of a performance already commercially released. 
3 See n. 2, supra. For example, according to the stipulated testimony 
of the Presley archivist at RCA Records, which held the exclusive rights to 
manufacture and distribute sound recordings of Presley performances from 
early in his career through the time of trial in this case, the "Elvis Presley 
Dorsey Shows" contained performances from Presley's appearances on a 
series of six television shows in January, February, and March 1956; "Elvis 
Presley From the Waist Up" contained performances from three appear-
ances on "The Ed Sullivan Show" in September and October 1956 and J anu-
ary 1957; "Plantation Rock" included a version of the title song recorded 
from an acetate , which other testimony indicated Dowling had purchased 
from the author of the song; "The Legend Lives On" included material from 
unreleased master tapes from the RCA Records inventory; "Rockin' with 
Elvis New Year's Eve" derived from a recording by an audience member 
at a 1976 concert in Pittsburgh; and "Elvis on Tour" came from the master 
tape or the film source of the film of the same name. Stipulated Testi-
mony of Joan Deary 24, 25, 35, 37, 40, 44. With the exceptions of "Planta-
tion Rock" and "Elvis on Tour, " quantities of each of these albums were 
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thorization from or paid royalties to the owners of the copy-
rights in the musical compositions. 4 
In the beginning, Dowling, who resided_ near Baltimore, 
handled the "artistic" end of the operation, contributing his 
knowledge of the Presley subculture, seeking out and select-
ing the musical material, designing the covers and labels, and 
writing the liner notes, while Theaker, who lived in Los An-
geles _and had some familiarity with the music industry, took 
care of the business end, arranging for the record pressings, 
distributing catalogs, and filling orders. In early 1979, how-
ever, having come to suspect that the FBI was investigating 
the West Coast operation, Theaker began making shipments 
by commercial trucking companies of large quantities of the 
albums to Dowling in Maryland. Throughout 1979 and 1980, 
the venturers did their marketing through Send Service, a la-
beling and addressing entity, which distributed at least 
50,000 copies of their catalog and advertising flyers to ad-
dresses on mailing lists provided by Theaker and Dowling. 
Theaker would collect customers' orders from post office 
boxes in Glendale, Cal., and mail them to Dowling in Mary-
land, who would fill the orders. The two did a substantial 
business: the stipulated testimony establishes that through-
out this period Dowling mailed several hundred packages per 
'See Stipulation re Copyrights, Royalties and Licenses 111-125, and 
Stipulation re Songs on Albums 127-145. The Copyright Act requires 
record manufacturers to obtain licenses and pay royalties to copyright 
holders upon pressing records that contain performances of copyrighted 
musical compositions. 17 U. S. C. § 115. 
While motion-picture copyrights protect the soundtracks of Presley's 
movies, Congress did not extend federal copyright protection to sound re-
cordings until the Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 
391, and then only to sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972. See 
Goldstein v. California , 412 U. S. 546, 551-552 (1973). Therefore, most 
of the sound recordings involved in this case, as opposed to the musical 
compositions performed, are apparently not protected by copyright. In 
any event, the § 2314 counts rely solely on infringement of copyrights to 
musical compositions. See n. 1, supra. 
-
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week and regularly spent $1,000 per week in postage. The 
men also had occasion to make large shipments from Los- An-
geles to Minor in Miami, who purchased quantities of their 
albums for resale through his own channels. 
The eight § 2314 counts on which Dowling was convicted 
arose out of six shipments of bootleg phonorecords from Los 
Angeles to Baltimore and two shipments from Los Angeles to 
Miami. See n. 1, supra. The evidence established that 
each shipment included thousands of albums, that each album 
contained performances of copyrighted musical compositions 
for the use of which no licenses had been obtained nor royal-
ties paid, and that the value of each shipment attributable to 
copyrighted material exceeded the statutory minimum. 
Dowling appealed from all the convictions save those for 
copyright infringement, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all respects. 739 F. 
2d 1445 (1984). As to the charges under § 2314, the court re-
lied on its decision in United States v. Belmont, 715 F. 2d 459 
(1983), cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1984), where it had held 
that interstate transportation of videotape cassettes contain-
ing unauthorized copies of copyrighted motion pictures in-
volved stolen goods within the meaning of the statute. 5 As 
in Belmont, the court reasoned that the rights of copyright 
owners in their protected property were indistinguishable 
from ownership interests in other types of property and were 
equally deserving of protection under the statute. 739 F. 
2d, at 1450, quoting 715 F. 2d, at 461-462. 
We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict 
among the Circuits 6 concerning the application of the statute 
•See also United States v. Atherton, 561 F. 2d 747, 752 (CA9 1977) (mo-
tion pictures); United States v. Drebin, 557 F. 2d 1316, 1328 (CA9 1977) 
(motion pictures), cert. denied, 436 U. S. 904 (1978); United States v. 
Minor, supra (sound recordings). 
6 In United States v. Smith, 686 F. 2d 234 (CA5 1982), the court held 
that interstate transportation of unauthorized copies of copyrighted motion 
pictures recorded "off the air" during television broadcasting did not fall 
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to interstate shipments of bootleg and pirated sound record-
ings and motion pictures whose unauthorized distribution in-
fringed valid copyrights. -- U. S. -- (1985). 
II 
Federal crimes, of course, "are solely creatures of statute." 
Liparota v. United States, -- U.S.--, -- (1985) (slip 
op. 5), citing United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812). 
Accordingly, when assessing the reach of a federal criminal 
statute, we must pay close heed to language, legislative his-
tory, and purpose in order strictly to determine the scope 
of the conduct the enactment forbids. Due respect for the 
prerogatives of Congress in defining federal crimes prompts 
restraint in this area, where we typically find a "narrow 
interpretation" appropriate. See Williams v. United States, 
458 U. S. 279, 290 (1982). Chief Justice Marshall early 
observed: 
"The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, 
is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It 
is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of 
individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of 
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial 
department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which 
is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment." United 
States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820). 
issue have either agreed with the Ninth Circuit that interstate transporta-
tion of copies of infringing motion pictures and sound recordings comes 
within the statute, or assumed the same. See United St,a,tes v. Drum, 733 
F. 2d 1503, 1505-1506 (CAll) (sound recordings), cert. denied, -- U. S. 
- (1984); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F. 2d 1517, 1519-1521 (CAll 
1984) (motion pictures); United States v. Whetzel, 191 U. S. App. D. C. 
184, 187, n. 10, 589 F . 2d 707, 710, n. 10 (1978) (sound recordings); United 
St,a,tes v. Berkwitt, 619 F . 2d 649, 656-658 (CA7 1980) (sound recordings); 
United St,a,tes v. Gallant, 570 F . Supp. 303, 310-314 (SDNY 1983) (sound 
recordings); United St,a,tes v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F . Supp. 380, 385-391 
(EDNY 1981) (sound recordings). See also United States v. Steerwell Lei-
sure Corp. , 598 F . Supp. 171, 174 (WDNY 1984) (video games). 
-
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Thus, the Court has stressed repeatedly that "' "when choice 
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Con-
gress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose 
the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have 
spoken in language that is clear and definite.""' Williams 
v. United States, 458 U. S., at 290, quoting United States v. 
Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971), which in turn quotes United 
States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S: 218, 
221-222 (1952). 
A 
Applying that prudent rule of construction here, we exam-
ine at the outset the statutory language. Section 2314 re-
quires, first, that the defendant have transported "goods, 
wares, [or] merchandise" in interstate or foreign commerce; 
second, that those goods have a value of "$5,000 or more"; 
and, third, that the defendant "kno[ w] the same to have been 
stolen, converted or taken by fraud." Dowling does not con-
test that he caused the shipment of goods in interstate com-
merce, or that the shipments had sufficient value to meet the 
monetary requirement. He argues, instead, that the goods 
shipped were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud." In 
response, the Government does not suggest that Dowling 
wrongfully came by the phonorecords actually shipped or the 
physical materials from which they were made; nor does it 
contend that the objects that Dowling caused to be shipped, 
the bootleg phonorecords, were "the same" as the copyrights 
in the musical compositions that he infringed by unauthorized 
· distribution of Presley performances of those compositions. 
The Government argues, however, that the shipments come 
within the reach of § 2314 because the phonorecords physi-
cally embodied performances of musical compositions that 
Dowling had no legal right to distribute. According to the 
Government, the unauthorized use of the musical compo-
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taken by fraud" within the meaning of the statute. 7 We 
must determine, therefore, whether phonorecords that in-
clude the performance of copyrighted musical compositions 
for the use of which no authorization has been sought nor roy-
alties paid are consequently "stolen, converted or taken by 
7 The Government argues in the alternative that even if the unau-
thorized use of copyrighted musical compositions does not alone render the 
phonorecords contained in these shipments "stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud," the record contains evidence amply establishing that the bootleg-
gers obtained the source material through illicit means. The Government 
points to testimony, for example, that the custodians of the tapes contain-
ing the outtakes which found their way onto Dowling's records neither au-
thorized their release nor permitted access to them by unauthorized per-
sons. App. 22-23, 34, 38-39, 42-43, 46. According to the Government, 
the wrongfully obtained tapes which contained the musical material should 
be considered "the same" as the phonorecords onto which the sounds were 
transferred, which were therefore "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" 
within the meaning of§ 2314. Cf. United States v. Bottone; 365 F. 2d 389 
(CA2), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 974 (1966). 
For several reasons, we decline to consider this alternative basis for up-
holding Dowling's convictions. The § 2314 counts in the indictment were 
founded exclusively on the allegations that the shipped phonorecords, 
which contained "Elvis Presley performances of copyrighted musical com-
positions," were "stolen, converted and taken by fraud, in that they were 
manufactured without the consent of the copyright proprietors." Seen. 1, 
supra. The decision of the Court of Appeals does not rely on any theory of 
illegal procurement; it rests solely on a holding that "Dowling's unau-
thorized sale of phonorecords of copyrighted material clearly involved 
'goods, wares or merchandise' within the meaning of the statute." 739 F. 
2d 1445, 1450-1451 (CA9 1984). Moreover, even assuming that the stipu-
lated testimony contained sufficient evidence to establish the unlawful pro-
curement of the source material, the Government made no attempt in the 
District Court to address the difficult problems of valuation under its alter-
native theory. For example, it introduced no evidence that might have 
established the value of the tapes allegedly stolen from the RCA archives, 
nor how that value might relate to the value of the goods ultimately 
shipped. Instead, its evidence concerning the value of the interstate ship-
ments of records attempted to isolate the value attributable to the copy-
righted musical compositions. App. 24-33. Under these circumstances, 
we assess the validity of Dowling's convictions only under the allegations 
made in the indictment. 
-
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fraud" for purposes of § 2314. We conclude that they are 
not. 
The courts interpreting § 2314 have never required, of 
course, that the items stolen and transported remain in en-
tirely unaltered form. See, e. g., United States v. Moore, 
571 F. 2d 154, 158 (CA3) (counterfeit printed Ticketron tick-
ets "the same" as stolen blanks from which they were 
printed), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 956 (1978). Nor does it 
matter that the item owes a major portion of its value to an 
intangible component. See, e. g. , United States v. 
Seagraves, 265 F. 2d 876 (CA3 1959) (geophysical maps iden-
tifying possible oil deposits); United States v. Greenwald, 479 
F. 2d 320 (CA6) (documents bearing secret chemical formu-
lae), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 854 (1973). But these cases and 
others prosecuted under § 2314 have always involved physical 
"goods, wares, [or] merchandise" that have themselves been 
"stolen, converted or taken by fraud." This basic element 
comports with the common-sense meaning of the statutory 
language: by requiring that the "goods, wares, [or] merchan-
dise" be "the same" as those "stolen, converted or taken by 
fraud," the provision seems clearly to contemplate a physical 
identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those 
eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking 
of the subject goods. 
In contrast, the Government's theory here would make 
theft, conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropria-
tion of statutorily protected rights in copyright. The copy-
right owner, however, holds no ordinary chattel. A copy-
right, like other intellectual property, comprises a series of 
carefully defined and carefully delimited interests to which 
the law affords correspondingly exact protections. "Section 
106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights 
to the owner of the copyright, " which include the rights "to 
publish, copy, and distribute the author's work." Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, -- U. S. 
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ever, "[t]his protection has never accorded the copyright 
owner complete control over all possible uses of his work." 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. --, 
-- (1984) (slip op. 13-14); id., at -- (dissenting opinion) 
(slip op. 7). For example, § 107 of the Copyright.Act "codi-
fies the traditional privilege of other authors to make 'fair 
use' of an earlier writer's work." Harper & Row, supra, at 
-- (slip op. 6). Likewise, § 115 grants compulsory licenses · 
in nondramatic musical works. Thus, the property rights of 
a copyright holder have a character distinct from the posses-
sory interest of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or] mer-
chandise," for the copyright holder's dominion is subjected to 
precisely defined limits. 
It follows that interference with copyright does not easily 
equate with theft, conversion, or fraud. The Copyright Act 
even employs a separate term of art to define one who mis-
appropriates a copyright: "'Anyone who violates any of the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner,' that is, anyone who 
trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing 
the use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set 
forth in the statute, 'is an infringer of the copyright.' [ 17 
U. S. C.] § 501(a)." Sony Corp., supra, at-- (slip op. 15). 
There is no dispute in this case that Dowling's unauthorized 
inclusion on his bootleg albums of performances of copy-
righted compositions constituted infringement of those copy-
rights. It is less clear, however, that the taking that occurs 
when an infringer arrogates the use of another's protected 
work comfortably fits the terms associated with physical 
removal employed by § 2314. The infringer invades a 
statutorily defined province guaranteed to the copyright 
holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over 
the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use. 
While one may colloquially link infringement with some gen-
eral notion of wrongful appropriation, infringement plainly 
implicates a more complex set of property interests than does 
run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. As a result, it 
-
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fits but awkwardly with the language Congress chose-"sto-
len, converted or taken by fraud"-to describe the sorts of 
goods whose interstate shipment § 2314 makes criminal. 8 \ 
"And, when interpreting a criminal statute that does not ex-
plicitly reach the conduct in question, we are reluctant to 
base an expansive reading on inferences drawn from subjec-
tive and variable 'understandings."' Williams v. United 
State$, 458 U. S., at 286. 
B 
In light of the ill-fitting language, we turn to consider 
whether the history and purpose of § 2314 evince a plain con-
gressional intention to reach interstate shipments of goods in-
fringing copyrights. Our examination of the background of 
the provision makes more acute our reluctance to read§ 2314 
to ·encompass merchandise whose contraband character de-
rives from copyright infringement. 
Congress enacted § 2314 as an extension of the National 
Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Pub. L. 70, 41 Stat. 324, currently 
codified at 18 U. S. C. § 2312. Passed in 1919, the earlier 
Act was an attempt to supplement the efforts of the States to 
combat automobile thefts. Particularly in areas close to 
state lines, 9 state law enforcement authorities were seriously 
8 The dissent relies on United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407 (1957), 
and Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (1952) , to give § 2314 a 
"very broad" reading. Post, at 3-4. In Turley , after considering the pur-
pose of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act to combat interstate trans-
portation of feloniously taken vehicles, the Court rejected an interpretation 
of "stolen" which would have limited that term to common-law larceny. 
352 U. S. , at 417. Similarly, in Morissette, in considering the language of 
18 U. S. C. § 641 providing that "whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or 
knowingly converts" Government property be subject to specified penal-
ties, the Court pointed out that conversion extends beyond the common-
law definition of stealing. 342 U. S. , at 271-272. Neither Turley nor 
Morissette involved copyright law specifically or intellectual property in 
general; neither, therefore, sheds light on the particular problems pre-
sented by this case. See Part II B-D, infra. 
• See 58 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1919) (statement of Rep. Reavis); id., at 5474 
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hampered by car thieves' ability to transport stolen vehicles 
beyond the jurisdiction in which the theft occurred. 10 Legis-
lating pursuant to its commerce power, 11 Congress made un-
lawful the interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, 
thereby filling in the enforcement gap by "strik[ing] down 
State lines which serve as barriers to protect [these inter-
state criminals] from justice." 58 Cong. Rec. 5476 (1919) 
(statement of Rep. Newton). 12 
Congress acted to fill an identical° enforcement gap when in 
1934 it "extend[ed] the provisions of the National Motor Ve-
hicle Theft Act to other stolen property" by means of the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act. Act of May 22, 1934, 48 Stat. 
794. See S. Rep. No. 538, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934); 
H. R. Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934); H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 1599, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 3 (1934). 
Again, Congress acted under its commerce power to assist 
the States' efforts to foil the "roving criminal," whose move-
ment across state lines stymied local law enforcement offi-
10 See id., at 5471 (1919) (statement of Rep. Dyer) ("State laws upon the 
subject have been inadequate to meet the evil. Thieves steal automobiles 
and take them from one State to another and ofttimes have associates in 
this crime who receive and sell the stolen machines"). 
"See, e.g., id., at 5471-5472 (statement of Rep. Dyer); id., at 
5475-5476 (statement of Rep. Newton). 
12 This Court has explained: 
"By 1919, the law of most States against local theft had developed so as 
to include not only common-law larceny but embezzlement, false pretenses, 
larceny by trick, and other types of wrongful taking. The advent of the 
automobile, however, created a new problem with which the States found 
it difficult to deal. The automobile was uniquely suited to felonious taking 
whether by larceny, embezzlement or false pretenses. It was a valuable, 
salable article which itself supplied the means for speedy escape. 'The 
automobile [became] the perfect chattel for modern large-scale theft.' 
This challenge could be best met through use of the Federal Government's 
jurisdiction over interstate commerce. The need for federal action in-
creased with the number, distribution and speed of the motor vehicles 
until, by 1919, it became a necessity. The result was the National Motor 
Vehicle Theft Act.'' United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 413-414 
(1957) (footnote omitted). 
-
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cials. 78 Cong. Rec. 2947 (1934) (statement of Attorney 
General Cummings). 13 As with its progenitor, Congress re-
sponded in the National Stolen Property Act to "the need for 
federal action" in an area that normally would have been left 
to state law. United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 417 
(1957). 
No such need for supplemental federal action has ever ex-
isted, however, with respect to copyright infringement, for 
the obvious reason that Congress always has had the be-
stowed authority to legislate directly in this area. Article I, 
§ 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall 
have the power 
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." 
By virtue of the explicit constitutional grant, Congress has 
the unquestioned authority to penalize directly the distribu-
tion of goods that infringe copyright, whether or not those 
goods affect interstate commerce. Given that power, it is 
implausible to suppose that Congress intended to combat the 
problem of copyright infringement by the circuitous route hy-
pothesized by the Government. See United States v. Smith, 
686 F. 2d 234, 246 (CA5 1982). Of course, the enactment of 
criminal penalties for copyright infringement would not pre-
vent Congress from choosing as well to criminalize the inter-
13 The Attorney General explained: "These criminals have made full use 
of the improved methods of transportation and communication, and have 
taken advantage of the limited jurisdiction possessed by State authorities 
in pursuing fugitive criminals, and of the want of any central coordinating 
agency acting on behalf of all of the States. In pursuing this class of of-
fenders, almost inevitably breakdown of law enforcement results from this 
want of some coordinating and centralized law enforcement agency . .. . 
[T]he territorial limitations on [local law enforcement authorities'] jurisdic-
tion prevent them from adequately protecting their citizens from this type 
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state shipment of infringing goods. But in dealing with the 
distribution of such goods, Congress has never thought it 
necessary to distinguish between intrastate and interstate 
activity. Nor does any good reason to do so occur to us. In 
sum, the premise of § 2314-the need to fill with federal ac-
tion an enforcement chasm created by limited state jurisdic-
tion-simply does not apply to the conduct the Government 
seeks_ to reach here. 
C 
The history of copyright infringement provisions affords 
additional reason to hesitate before extending § 2314 to cover 
the interstate shipments in this case. Not only has Congress 
chiefly relied on an array of civil remedies to provide copy-
right holders protection against infringement, see 17 
U. S. C. §§ 502-505, but in exercising its power to render 
criminal certain forms of copyright infringement, it has acted 
with exceeding caution. 
The first full-fledged criminal provisions appeared in the 
Copyright Act of 1909, and specified that misdemeanor penal-
ties of up to one year in jail or a fine between $100 and $1,000, 
or both, be imposed upon "[a]ny person who willfully and for 
profit" infringed a protected copyright. 14 This provision was 
1
• Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 28, 35 Stat. 1082. Interestingly, however, the 
1909 Act did not extend criminal liability to infringement by unauthorized 
mechanical reproduction of copyrighted musical compositions subject to 
compulsory licensing, the category of infringement underlying the § 2314 
counts here. See§ 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081. Congress did not remove this bar 
until the Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, which, 
while for the first time extending federal copyright coverage to sound re-
cordings, see n. 4, supra, also made willful infringement of copyright in 
musical compositions subject to the general criminal provision. See 85 
Stat. 392. 
Congress first provided criminal penalties for copyright infringement in 
the Act of January 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481, which made a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by imprisonment for one year of the unlawful performance or pres-
entation, done willfully and for profit, of a copyrighted dramatic or musical 
composition. See also Act of May 31, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124 (fixed civil pen-
alties, one-half payable to the United States, for unauthorized copying of 
-
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little used. In 1974, however, Congress amended the sec-
tion, by then 17 U. S. C. § 104 by the 1947 revision, 15 substan-
tially to increase penalties for record piracy. 16 The new ver-
sion retained the existing language, but supplemented it with 
a new subsection (b), which provided that one who "willfully 
and for profit" infringed a copyright in sound recordings 
would be subject to a fine of up to $25,000 or imprisonment 
for up to one year, or both. 17 U. S. C. § 104(b) (1975 ed., 
Supp. V). 17 The legislative history demonstrates that in in-
creasing the penalties available for this category of infringe-
ment, Congress carefully calibrated the penalty to the prob-
lem: it had come to recognize that "record piracy is so 
profitable that ordinary penalties fail to deter prospective of-
fenders." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1581, p. 4 (1974). Even so, 
because it considered record piracy primarily an economic of-
fense, Congress, after serious consideration, rejected a pro-
posal to increase the available term of imprisonment to three 
years for a first offense and seven years for a subsequent of-
fense. Ibid. 
When in 1976, after more than 20 years of study, Congress 
adopted a comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act, see 
Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, -- U. S. --, -----
(1985) (slip op. 5-7); Sony Corp. , 464 U. S., at-, n. 9 (dis-
senting opinion) (slip op. 7), it again altered the scope of the 
criminal infringement actions, albeit cautiously. Section 
506(a) of the new Act provided: 
copyrighted book, chart, or map). See generally Young, Criminal Copy-
right Infringement and a Step Beyond, reprinted in ASCAP Copyright 
Law Symposium Number Thirty 157 (1983); Gawthrop, An Inquiry Into 
Criminal Copyright Infringement, reprinted in ASCAP Copyright Law 
Symposium Number Twenty 154 (1972). 
16 Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. 80-281, 61 Stat. 652. 
16 Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873. 
17 A second violation subjected the offender to a fine of up to $50,000 or 
imprisonment for not more than two years , or both. 17 U. S. C. § 104(b) 
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"Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and 
for purposes of commercial advantage or private finan-
cial gain shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned for not more than one year, or both: Provided, how-
ever, that any person who infringes willfully and for 
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain the copyright in a sound recording afforded by sub-
sections (1), (2), or (3) of section 106 or the copyright in a 
motion picture afforded by subsection (1), (3), or (4) of 
section 106 shall be fined not more than $25,000 or im-
prisoned for not more than one year, or both, for the first 
such offense and shall be fined not more than $50,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than two years, or both, for any 
subsequent offense." 17 U. S. C. § 506(a) (1976 ed.). 
Two features of this provision are noteworthy: first, Con-
gress extended to motion pictures the enhanced penalties ap-
plicable by virtue of prior § 104 to infringement of rights in 
sound recordings; and, second, Congress recited the infring-
ing uses giving rise to liability. It is also noteworthy that 
despite the urging of representatives of the film industry, see 
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 716 (1975) (statement of Jack Valenti, President of the 
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.), and the initial 
inclination of the Senate, see S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 146 
(1975), Congress declined once again to provide felony penal-
ties for copyright infringement involving sound recordings 
and motion pictures. 
Finally, by the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, Congress chose to 
address the problem of bootlegging and piracy of records, 
tapes, and films by imposing felony penalties on such activi-
ties. Section 5 of the 1982 Act revised 17 U. S. C. § 506(a) to 
provide that "[a]ny person who infringes a copyright willfully 
and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
-
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gain shall be punished as provided in section 2319 of title 18." 
Section 2319(b)(l), in turn, was then enacted to provide for a 
fine of up to $250,000, or imprisonment of up to five years, or 
both, if the offense "involves the reproduction or distribution, 
during any one-hundred-and-eighty-day period, of at least 
one thousand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright 
in one or more sound recordings [or] at least sixty-five copies 
infringing the copyright in one or more motion pictures or 
other audiovisual works." Subsection (b)(2) provides for a 
similar fine and up to two years' imprisonment if the offense 
involves "more than one hundred but less than one thousand 
phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or , 
more sound recordings [or] more than seven but less than 
sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in one or more mo-
tion pictures or other audiovisual works. " And subsection 
(b)(3) provides for a fine of not more that $25,000 and up to 
one year's imprisonment in any other case of willful infringe-
ment. The legislative history indicates that Congress set 
out from a belief that the existing misdemeanor penalties for 
copyright infringement were simply inadequate to deter the 
enormously lucrative activities of large-scale bootleggers and 
pirates. See 128 Cong. Rec. H1951 (May 10, 1982) (remarks 
of Rep. Kastenmeier); The Piracy and Counterfeiting 
Amendments Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 691 Before the Sub-
committee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1981) (statement of Renee 
L. Szybala, Special Assistant to the Associate Attorney Gen-
eral). Accordingly, it acted to "strengthen the laws against 
record, tape, and film piracy'' by "increas[ing] the penalties 
... for copyright infringements involving such products," 
thereby "bring[ing] the penalties for record and film piracy 
. . . into line with the enormous profits which are being 
reaped from such activities." S. Rep. No. 97-274, pp. 1, 7 
(1981). 18 • 
18 The Act also substantially increased penalties for trafficking in coun-
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Thus, the history of the criminal infringement provisions of 
the Copyright Act reveals a good deal of care on Congress' 
part before subjecting copyright infringement to serious 
criminal penalties. First, Congress hesitated long before 
imposing felony sanctions on copyright infringers. Second, 
when it di<;i so, it carefully chose those areas of infringement \ 
that required severe response--specificall31, sound recordings 
and motion pictures-and studiously graded penalties even in 
those areas of heightened concern. This step-by-step, care-
fully considered approach is consistent with Congress' tradi-
tional sensitivity to the special concerns implicated by the 
copyright laws. 
In stark contrast, the Government'$ theory of this case 
presupposes a congressional decision to bring the felony pro-
visions of § 2314, which make available the comparatively 
light fine of not more than $10,000 but the relatively harsh 
term of imprisonment of up to 10 years, to bear on the distri-
bution of a sufficient quantity of any infringing goods simply 
because of the presence here of a factor-interstate transpor-
tation-not otherwise thought relevant to copyright law. · 
The Government thereby presumes congressional adoption of 
an indirect but blunderbuss solution to a problem treated 
with precision when considered directly. To the contrary, 
the discrepancy between the two approaches convinces us 
that Congress had no intention to reach copyright infringe-
ment when it enacted § 2314. 
visual works. 18 U. S. C. § 2318. 
The dissent suggests that by providing that the new penalties "shall be 
in addition to any other provisions of Title 17 or any other law," 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2319(a), Congress "implicitly'' approved the interpretation of § 2314 
urged by the Government. Post, at 5. Neither the text nor the legisla-
tive history of either the 1982 Act or earlier copyright legislation evidences 
any congressional awareness, let alone approval, of prosecutions like the 
one now before us. In the absence of any such indication, we decline to 
read the general language appended to § 2319(a) impliedly to validate ex-








The broad consequences of the Government's theory, both 
in the field of copyright and in kindred fields of intellectual 
property law, provide a final and dispositive factor against 
reading § 2314 in the manner suggested. For example, in 
Harper & Row, supra, this Court very recently held that The 
Nation, a weekly magazine of political commentary, had in-
fringed former President Ford's copyright in the unpublished 
manuscript of his memoirs by verbatim excerpting of some 
300 words from the work. It rejected The Nation's argu-
ment that the excerpting constituted fair use. Presented 
with the facts of that case as a hypothetical at oral argument 
in the present litigation, the Government conceded that its 
theory of § 2314 would permit prosecution of the magazine if 
it transported copies of sufficient value across state lines. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. Whatever the wisdom or propriety of 
The Nation's decision to publish the excerpts, we would 
pause, in the absence of any explicit indication of congres-
sional intention, to bring such conduct within the purview of 
a criminal statute making available serious penalties for the 
interstate transportation of goods "stolen, converted or taken 
by fraud." 
Likewise, the field of copyright does not cabin the Govern-
ment's theory, which would as easily encompass the law of 
patents and other forms of intellectual property. If "the in-
tangible idea protected by the copyright is effectively made 
tangible by its embodiment upon the tapes," United States v. 
Gottesman, 724 F. 2d 1517, 1520 (CAll 1984), phonorecords, 
or films shipped in interstate commerce as to render those 
items stolen goods for purposes of § 2314, so too would the 
intangible idea protected by a patent be made tangible by its 
embodiment in an article manufactured in accord with pat-
ented specifications. Thus, as the Government as much as 
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the statute would readily permit its application to interstate 
shipments of patent-infringing goods. Despite its un-
doubted power to do so, however, Congress has not provided 
criminal penalties for distribution of goods infringing valid 
patents. 19 Thus, the rationale supporting application of the 
statute under the circumstances of this case would equally 
justify its use in wide expanses of the law which Congress has 
evidenced no intention to enter by way of criminal sanction. 20 
This factor militates strongly against the reading proffered 
by the Government. Cf. Williams v. ·u nited States, 458 
U. S., at 287. 
III 
No more than other legislation do criminal statutes take on 
straightjackets upon enactment. In sanctioning the use of 
§ 2314 in the manner urged by the Government here, the 
Courts of Appeals understandably have sought to utilize an 
existing and readily available tool to combat the increasingly 
serious problem of bootlegging, piracy, and copyright in-
fringement. Nevertheless, the deliberation with which Con-
gress over the last decade has addressed the problem of copy-
1
• Congress instead has relied on provisions affording patent owners a 
civil cause of action. 35 U. S. C. §§ 281-294. Among the available reme-
dies are treble damages for willful infringement. § 284; see, e. g., Ameri- . 
can Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 415 F. 2d 373, 378-379 (CA2 1969), cert. 
denied, 396 U. S. 1038 (1970). See generally 2 P. Rosenberg, Patent Law . 
Fundamentals § 17.08 (2d ed. 1984). The only criminal provision relating 
to patents is 18 U. S. C. § 497, which proscribes the forgery, counterfeit-
ing, or false alteration of letters patent, or the uttering thereof. See also 
35 U. S. C. § 292 ($500 penalty, one-half to go to person suing and one-half 
to the United States, for false marking of patent status). 
20 The Government's rationale would also apply to goods infringing 
trademark r ights. Yet, despite having long and extensively legislated in 
this area, see federal Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1051 et seq., in the modern era Congress only recently has resorted to 
criminal sanctions to control trademark infringement. See Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, ch. XV, 98 Stat. 2178. See 
also S. Rep. No. 98-526, pp. 1-2, 5 (1984); 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and 
Unfair Competition § 30.39 (2d ed. 1984). 
-· 
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right infringement for profit, as well as the precision with 
which it has chosen to apply criminal penalties in this area, 
demonstrates anew the wisdom ofleaving it to the legislature 
to define crime and prescribe penalties. 21 Here, the lan-
guage of§ 2314 does not "plainly and unmistakably'' cover pe-
titioner Dowling's conduct, United States v. Lacher, 134 
U. S. 624, 628 (1890); the purpose of the provision to fill gaps 
in state law enforcement does not couch the problem under 
attack; and the rationale employed to apply the statute to pe-
titioner's conduct would support its extension to significant 
bodies 9f law that Congress gave no indication it intended to 
touch. In sum, Congress has not spoken with the requisite 
clarity. Invoking the "time-honored interpretive guideline" 
that "'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes 
should be resolved in favor of lenity,"' Liparota v. United 
States, -- U. S. --, -- (1985) (slip op. 8), quoting 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), we reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
21 Indeed, in opposing the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, the 
Government acknowledged that it no longer needs § 2314 to prosecute and 
punish serious copyright infringement. Adverting to the most recent con-
gressional copyright action, it advised the Court: 
"[A]pplication of Section 2314 ... to the sort of conduct involved in this 
case is of considerably diminished significance since passage, subsequent to 
the offenses involved in this case, of the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amend-
ments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 et seq. ·(codified at 17 
U. S. C. 506(a) and 18 U. S. C. 2318, 2319). The new statute provides for 
felony treatment for most serious cases of copyright infringement involving 
sound recordings and audiovisual materials and trafficking in counterfeit 
labels, while prior law provided only for misdemeanor treatment for first 
offenses under the copyright statutes. In view of the increased penalties 
provided under the new statute, prosecutors are likely to have less occa-
sion to invoke other criminal statutes in connection with copyright infring-
ing activity." Brief for United States in Opposition 8. 
These observations suggest the conclusion we have reached-that § 2314 
was not in the first place the proper means by which to counter the spread 
of copyright infringement in sound recordings and motion pictures. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-589 
PAUL EDMOND DOWLING, PETITIONER v. UNITED 
STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June 28, 1985] · 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting. 
The Court holds today that § 2314 does not apply to this 
case because the rights of a copyright holder are "different" 
from the rights of owners of other kinds of property. The 
Court does not explain, however, how the differences it iden-
tifies are relevant either under the language of § 2314 or in 
terms of the purposes of the statute. Because I believe that 
the language of§ 2314 fairly covers the interstate transporta-
tion of goods containing unauthorized use of copyrighted ma-
terial, I dissent. 
Section 2314 provides for criminal penalties against any 
person who ''transports in interstate or foreign commerce 
any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the 
value of $5,000 or more, lmowing the same to have been 
stolen, converted or taken by fraud." 18 U. S. C. § 2314. 
There is no dispute that the items Dowling transported in 
interstate commerce-bootleg Elvis Presley records-are 
goods, wares, or merchandise. Nor is there a dispute that 
the records contained copyrighted Elvis Presley perform-
ances that Dowling had no rigb.t to reproduce and distribute. 
The only issue here is whether the unauthorized use of a 
copyright may be "equate[d] with theft, conversion, or fraud" 
for purposes of § 2314. Ante, at 10. Virtually every court 
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broad enough to cover activities such as Dowling's. See, 
e.g., United States v. Drum, 733 F. 2d 1503, 1505-:-1506 
(CAll), cert denied, -- U. S. -- (1984); United States v. 
Whetzel, 191 U. S. App. D. C. 184, 187, n. 10, 589 F. 2d 707, 
710, ri. 10 (1978); United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F. 2d 649, 
656-658 (CA7 1980); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 
F. Supp. 380, 385-391 (EDNY 1981). The only case cited by 
the Court that lends support to its holding is United States v. 
. Smith, 686 F. 2d 234 (CA5 1982). 1 The Court's decision 
today is thus contrary to the clear weight of authority. 
The Court focuses on the fact that "[t]he copyright owner 
... holds no ordinary chattel." Arite, at 9 . . The Court 
quite correctly notes that a copyright is "comprise[d] ... of 
carefully define.cl and carefully delimited interests," ibid., and 
that the copyright owner does not enjoy "'complete control 
over all possible uses of his work,"' id., at 10, quoting Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.--, --
(1984) (slip op. at 13-14). But among the rights a copyright 
owner enjoys is the right to publish, copy, and distribute the 
copyrighted work. Indeed, these rights define virtually the 
entire scope of an owner's rights in intangible property such 
as a copyright. Interference with these rights may be "dif-
ferent" from the physical removal of tangible objects, but it 
not clear why this difference matters under the terms of 
§ 2314. The statute makes no distinction between tangible 
and intangible property. The basic goal of the National Sto-
len Property Act, thwarting the interstate transportation of 
misappropriated goods, is not served by the judicial imposi-
tion of this distinction. Although the rights of copyright 
1 In United States v. Drum, 733 F. 2d 1503 (CA11), cert. denied, --
U. S. --(1984), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered 
and rejected the arguments offered in United States v. Smith, 686 F. 2d 
234 (CA5 1982) and reiterated by the Court today. I agree with Drum 
that neither the language nor purpose of§ 2314 supports the view that the 
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owners in their property may be more limited than those of 
owners of other kinds of property, they are surely "just as 
deserving of protection .. .. " United States v. Drum, 
supra, at 1506. 
The Court concedes that § 2314 has never been interp~eted 
to require that the goods, wares, or merchandise stolen and 
transport.ed in violation of the statute remain in unaltered 
form. Ante, at 9. See also United States v. Bottone, 365 F. 
2d 389, 393-394 (CA2 1966). It likewise recognizes that the 
statute is applicable even when the misappropriated item 
"owes a major portion of its value to an intangible compo-
nent." Ante, at 9. The difficulty the Court finds with the 
application of § 2314 here is in finding a theft, conversion, or 
fraudulent taking, in light of the intangible nature of a copy-
right. But this difficulty, it seems to me, has more to do 
with its views on the relative evil of copyright infringement 
versus other kinds of thievery, than it does with interpreta-
tion of the statutory language. 
The statutory terms at issue here, i. e., "stolen, converted 
or taken by fraud," traditionally have been given broad scope 
by the courts. For example, in United States v. Turley , 352 
U. S. 407 (1957), this Court held that the term "stolen" in-
cluded all felonious takings with intent to deprive the owner 
of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of 
whether the theft would constitute larceny at common law. 
Id. , at 417. Similarly, in Morissette v. United States , 342 
U. S. 246 (1952), the Court stated that conversion "may be 
consummated without any intent to keep and without any 
wrongful taking, where the initial possession by the con-
verter was entirely lawful. Conversion may include misuse 
or abuse of property. It may reach use in an unauthorized 
manner or to an unauthorized extent of property placed in 
one's custody for limited use. " Id. , at 271-272. 
Dowling's unauthorized duplication and commercial ex-
ploitation of the copyrighted performances were intended to 
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the copyright owner. Under Turley , supra, his acts should 
be viewed as the theft of these performances. Likewise, 
Dowling's acts constitute the unauthorized use of another's 
property and are fairly cognizable as conversion under the 
Court's definition in Morissette. 
The Court invokes the familiar rule that a criminal statute 
is to be construed narrowly. This rule is intended to assure 
fair warning to the public, e. g., United States v. Bass, 404 
U. S. 336, 348 (1911); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 
25, 27 (1931), and is applied when statutory language is 
ambiguous or inadequate to put persons on notice of what the 
legislature has made a crime. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bass, supra; Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 
(1971); Bell v. United States , 349 U. S. 81, 83 (1955). I dis-
agree not with these principles, but with their application to 
this statute. As I read § 2314, it is not ambiguous, but sim-
ply very broad. The statute punishes individuals who trans-
port goods, wares, or merchandise worth $5,000 or more, 
!mowing "the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken 
by fraud." 18 U. S. C. §2314. As noted above, this Court 
has given the terms "stolen" and "converted" broad meaning 
in the past. The petitioner ~ould not have had any doubt 
that he was committing a theft as well as defrauding the 
copyright owner. 2 
The Court also emphasizes the fact that the copyright laws 
contain their own penalties for violation of their terms. But 
the fact that particular conduct may violate more· than one 
federal law does not foreclose the Government from making a 
choice as to which of the statutes should be the basis for an 
indictment. "The Court has long recognized that when an 
2 Indeed, there was stipulated testimony by a former employee of peti-
tioner's, himself an unindicted co-conspirator, that petitioner and his part-
ner ''were wary of any unusually large record orders, because they could be 
charged with an interstate transportation of stolen property if they 
shipped more than $5,000 worth of records." App. at A19 (Stipulation Re-
garding Testimony of Aca "Ace" Anderson). 
I 
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act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government 
may prosecute under either so long as it does not discrimi-
nate against any class of defendants." United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 123-124 (1979). 
Finally, Congress implicitly has approved the Govern-
ment's use of § 2314 to reach conduct like Dowling's. In' 
adopting the Piracy and Counterfeiting AmendmeJ\tS Act of 
1982, Pub. L. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, Congress provided that the 
new penalties "shall be in addition to any other provisions of 
title 17 or any other law." 18 U. S. C. § 2319(a) (emphasis 
added). The Senate Judiciary Committee specifically added 
the italicized language to clarify that the new provision "sup-
plement[s] existing remedies contained in copyright law or 
any other law." S: Rep. No. 274, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 
(emphasis added). Many courts had used § 2314 to reach the 
shipment of goods containing unauthorized use of copy-
righted material prior to the enactment of the Piracy and 
Counterfeiting Amendments Act. By choosing to make its 
new felony provisions supplemental,. Congress implicitly con-
sented to continued application of § 2314 to these offenses. 
Dowling and his partners "could not have doubted the 
criminal nature of their conduct .. . . " United States v. 
Bottone, supra, at 394. His claim that § 2314 does not reach 
his clearly unlawful use of copyrighted p~rformances evinces 
''the sort of sterile formality'' properly rejected by the vast 
majority of courts that have considered the question. 
United States v. Belmont, 715 F. 2d 459, 462 (CA9 1983), 
cert. denied, -- U. S. --(1984). Accordingly, I dissent. 
- -
84-589 Dowling v. United States (Annmarie) 
HAB for the Court 4/26/85 
1st draft 6/11/85 
2nd draft 6/18/85 
3rd draft 6/25/85 




1st draft 6/21/85 
Joined by BRW 6/24/ffi 
CJ 6/26/85 
BRW awaiting dissent 6/12/85 
HAB decided to vote to reverse 6/4/85 
WJB will reassign opinion to HAB 6/4/85 
CJ awaiting dissent 6/20/85 
